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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of
epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention
of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy
and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistoc-
racy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of
political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either violates rights or harms as
a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy
hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take
this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy—or, rather, democratic reform—over
epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough
to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown
that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic
theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various insti-
tutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might
arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we
might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk,
and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Between Democracy and Epistocracy
There has recently been talk about whether or not we would be better off replacing democracy
with something called epistocracy. While this new term has become somewhat in vogue, it is only a
contemporary articulation of a rather old idea. Epistocracy is simply a form of government which is
ruled by those who are identified as the knowers or the wise. This new interest in epistocracy, then, is
a renewal of the long debate over what form of government is best.
This revival of epistocracy is interesting in that it is a revival of an old argument. Many advocate
epistocracy as the superior alternative on the basis of similar arguments levied against democracy
prior to its increasing success at the turn of the 19th century. They objected that the common man
was too ignorant and unwise to be given power over government. To do so would result in the rule
of the mob. Evidently, democracy has been shown to be capable of overcoming such concerns. It
should be noted that this objection was perceived to be serious enough that, in the Federalist Papers,
James Madison went to some lengths to distinguish how the proposed “republic” would avoid these
concerns about “democracy”.1,2 Contemporary arguments for epistocracy are made on recognizably
similar grounds.
This renewed of interest in epistocracy has been inspired by new empirical research which shows
that their premise is not based on mere assumption or intuition.3 There is now evidence that most
people are, in fact, shockingly ignorant, irrational, and misinformed about politics.4 Given the sort
1James Madison, “The Federalist,” chap. No. 10 (New York: Barnes / Noble Books, 2006).
2It is telling that Madison’s preciously distinct republic is now commonly referred to and understood to be simply
democracy by all except pundits.
3New, here, meaning the development of political science in the last century.
4For further reference, see the following: Bennet, “”Know-Nothings” Revisited”: The Meaning of Political Ignorance
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of problems concerning modern democracies like deepening polarization and with one of their fun-
damental premises backed by empirical research, skeptics of democracy have now begun offering a
refreshed, more moderate argument for epistocracy.5 It is argued that while democracy may not be
doomed to failure epistocracy may still yet lead to better results. If we are interested in achieving the
best results, we should at least be open to considering epistocracywhich could, it is suggested, curb the
deleterious effects which arise when a majority of the public is irrational, ignorant, and misinformed.
The argument is a comparative one: it is not that democracy cannot work but that epistocracy may
perform better. It is this comparison that this paper is concerned with.
It may be helpful to further clarify just what is meant when we say epistocracy. Thankfully, this
task is fairly straightforward. Epistocracy is a form of government which is characterized by the way
political power is distributed. There are various forms of government which are categorized by the
way political power is distributed to create rulers: an autocracy is ruled by one person, a theocracy is
ruled by religious officials, a democracy is ruled by the people, and so on. Under an epistocracy, it is
the class of people identified as the knowers or the wise who are given rule.
The notion that the wise ought to rule, or should at least have considerably more say in ruling, is
not a new one. There are two classic examples which we might retroactively describe as epistocracies.
Moreover, these examples are, respectively, prototypical of what we could think of as radical and
moderate forms of epistocracies. These examples may provide useful context for understanding the
particular sort of epistocracy which is the focus of this paper.
The first is Plato’s Republic. In the Republic, Plato describes a good and virtuous city in order
to arrive at an elaboration of the concept of justice.6 Plato describes an idealized city comprised of
Today”; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campation; Converse,
“The nature of belief systems in mass publics (1964),” Converse, “Attitudes and Nonattitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue”;
Carpini andKeeter, “Stability andChange in theU.S. Public’s Knowledge of Politics”; Neuman, The Paradox ofMass Politics:
Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate; Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Amer-
icans’ Policy Preferences; Popkin and Dimock, “Political Knowledge and Civic Competence”; Price, “Political Information”;
Smith, The Unchanging American Voer.
5There seems to be an assumption that the present ills like polarization and factionalism are a result of this endemic
ignorance, irrationality, and misinformation.
6The Republic is, then, first and foremost concerned with ethics rather than politics. Regardless of whether we should
take Plato’s political account in the Republic as earnest or metaphorical, it remains both ubiquitous and influential.
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three castes. Relevant for our discussion, the ruling class is that of the philosopher-kings, who are
given absolute power. These philosopher-kings are cultivated from a young age through a strictly
regimented and lengthy education such that they would be finally ready to lead by age fifty.7 The
intended result is a city ruled by its wisdom-loving elements; the rulers rule because they are the
most knowledgeable and wise. This conception of epistocracy is prototypical of what I will call radical
epistocracy because of its authoritarian nature. This is to say, I will describe whatever formulation of
epistocracy as being more radical proportionally to how it concentrates more power into the class of
knowers or the wise.
The second example, which I take to be prototypical of moderate forms of epistocracy, was pro-
posed by John StuartMill. InConsiderations on Representative Government, Mill defends a principle
that it should be “professed by the state” and “embodied in the national institutions” that the “better
and wiser” are entitle to more influence over governing than others.8 This is held in tension with a
commitment to a principle of extensive participation in government by citizens.9 Mill believed that
political institutions ought to recognize that some people’s opinions are worth more than others as a
result of their greater knowledge or wisdom. As such, a plural voting systems was entertained where
citizens would be allowed more votes according to their eduction.10 By targeting education, it was
hoped that such a system would consequently empower the wise since, presumably, good education
would have promoted wisdom. I take this sort of conception to be prototypical of moderate epistoc-
racy. While political power is distributed such that it is concentrated in the hands of the knowers or
the wise, it is not exclusively possessed by that class. This is often taken to be less offensive or objec-
tionable compared to radical, authoritarian models like Plato’s Republic. Epistocracy, then, will be
described as moderate inversely to how extreme it is so long as it remains essentially epistocratic.
7Plato, Republic (New York: Barnes / Noble Books, 2004), Book V.
8John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009), p. 210.
9Ibid., Chapter 3.
10Ibid., p. 208.
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David Estlund reintroduced the topic of epistocracy, and coined the term, into contemporary dis-
cussion. Initially, in “Why Not Epistocracy?”, Estlund is primarily concerned with objecting to the
Millian view which he saw as the strongest or most plausible form of epistocracy.11,12 More signifi-
cantly, Estlund later gives a general argument against epistocracy in Democratic Authority. Jason
Brennan’s Against Democracy, which this paper is primarily concerned with for reasons described
below, appears to be at least in part a response to Estlund’s general argument. It will be useful for
appreciating some of Brennan’s arguments to spend a brief time on this general argument against
epistocracy.13
Estlund asserts that epistocratic theories must all be founded upon three tenets. These tenets are
necessary to motivate “a natural association between the ideas of truth and knowledge, on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, the ideas of expertise and authority.”14 The three tenets are as follows:
“1. The Truth Tenet: there are some true (at least in theminimal sense) procedure-independent
normative standards by which political decisions ought to be judged
2. The Knowledge Tenet: some (relatively few) people know those normative standards better
than others.
3. The Authority Tenet: The normative political knowledge of those who know better is a war-
rant for their having political authority over others.”15
11David Estlund, “Desire, Identity and Existence: Essays in honor of T. M. Penner,” chap. Why Not Epistocracy?, ed.
Naomi Reshotko (Academic Printing / Publishing, 2003), p.68.
12 Estlund puts forward a demographic objection that rule by the educated would not meet a general acceptability con-
dition for legitimate government. While Brennan makes some arguments regarding the demographic objection in Against
Democracy, it is outside the scope of this paper.
13 InDemocratic Authority, Estlundmakes the case for his epistemic proceduralism account of democratic authority. It
should be made clear that while I will object to Brennan’s reaction to Estlund, I will not be defending any of Estlund’s views
though they may be compatible.
14David M Estlund, Democratic authority : a philosophical framework (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2008), p. 30.
15Ibid.
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Should these three tenets all be true, then there is justification for the wise to have a special claim to
rule. Hence, it is supposed, that would be reason to hold epistocracy superior to democracy.
Estlund denies that these tenets are all true. He argues that the truth tenet and the knowledge
tenet ought to be granted.16 His argument is that even if they were true, and Estlund gives some brief
reasons why the they are plausible, he rejects the authority tenet. As Estlund puts it, “To state a rough
version: no one has authority or legitimate coercive power over another without a justification that
could be accepted by all qualified points of view.”17 Two sorts of arguments are given. First, that no
invidious comparison among citizens over their political wisdom would pass an appropriate general
acceptability standard.18 Secondly, he asserts there is an “expert/bias fallacy” when inferring that
someone has a greater claim to authority from the fact that they know better.19 Thus, it would appear
that the usual grounds for defending epistocracy are unavailable. I take this to be one of the more
persuasive conceptual arguments against epistocracy.
There is, however, a newargument for epistocracywhich seemingly avoidsEstlund’s general objec-
tion. In Against Democracy, Brennan summarily accepts these reasons.20 For the sake of argument,
let us also grant that Estlund’s and Brennan’s rejection of the authority tenet is true. As we will exam-
ine later in this paper, Brennan embarks on a novel approach tomake the case for epistocracy. Unlike
the traditional arguments which aremotivated by the intuition that the wise ought to rule, Brennan at-
tempts tomotivate the argument for epistocracy on aweaker claim. As he proposes, “Epistocrats need
only suggest that incompetent or unreasonable people should not be imposed on others as bosses.”21
In other words, this argument for epistocracy is instead inextricably intertwined with an argument
against democracy. This new approach seems to be a promising defense of epistocracy. As such, this
16Estlund, Democratic authority : a philosophical framework, p. 33.
17Ibid., p. 32.
18Ibid., p. 36.
19Ibid., p. 40.
20Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 17.
21Ibid.
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paper will be focused on how Brennan’s arguments should effect our evaluation between democracy
and epistocracy.
First, we ought to establish what makes epistocracy essentially an epistocracy. Estlund charac-
terizes epistocracy as “not metaphorically but literally authoritarian.”22 He holds that advocates of
democracy, which I will refer to as democrats within this paper, will want to disagree with advocates
of epistocracy, which I will refer to as epistocrats within this paper.23 However, there are some epis-
tocrats, like Catherine Holst, who argue that there is some spectrum between democracy and epistoc-
racy.24 It is suggested that there are various dimensions which might display epistocratic features of
varying degrees of formality or institutionalization. Thus, it is suggested that we can have democratic
epistocracy or epistocratic democracy “depending on the amount and quality of democratic [or epis-
tocratic] mechanisms.”25 This sort of approach, however, is unhelpfully vague if we are engaged in a
serious evaluation between democracy and epistocracy—especially when the involved arguments for
epistocracy intrinsically rest upon arguments against democracy. While it may be useful to character-
ize things as being democratic or epistocratic in the sense that they are democratic-like or epistocratic-
like, theremust be some clear categorical distinction between actual democracy and actual epistocracy.
Brennan proposes that “a political system is epistocratic to the extent it distributes political power in
proportion to knowledge or competence, as a matter of law or policy. This distribution has to be de
jure, not merely de facto.”26 In which case, the essential feature of democracy will be the institution-
alization of universal suffrage by law. This will be the basic distinction which I will be using in this
paper.
Next, some background assumptions of the following discussion should also be clarified. First, for
the sake of argument, I will assume that democracy is not justified on any proceduralist grounds or is
22Estlund, Democratic authority : a philosophical framework, p. 31.
23Ibid.
24CatherineHolst, “What is epistocracy?,” in Sacred Science?, ed. Lund-OlsenØyen S.A. andVaageN.S. T. (Wageningen:
Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2012), p. 43.
25Ibid., p. 45.
26Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 208.
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intrinsically just. Brennanmakes a number of arguments to this end. He argues that, for example, that
democracy does not actually empower most individuals nor should we be concerned with “semiotic”
arguments for democracy. However, it is unclear that this is entirely necessary; he specifies that
his comparison between the two systems is made solely in instrumental terms. That is to say, “It
ultimately comes down to which system would perform better in the real world.”27 I will adopt these
same terms in my analysis of the comparison between democracy and epistocracy. As such, I will
focus on the evaluation on the instrumental justifications of either systems. This is not say that I am
entirely sympathetic to the arguments which Brennan makes towards this end. However, if after my
analysis of how democracy compares to epistocracy on purely instrumental grounds there are also
other non-instrumental reasons to prefer democracy, then so much the better.
Second, I will take it as an assumption that the majority of people are deeply ignorant, irrational,
ormisinformedwhen it comes to politics. The body of empirical research regarding thematter arrives
at a consensus that overall levels of knowledge is worryingly low. Philip Converse offers the maxim
“the two simplest truths I know about the distribution of political information in modern electorates
are that the mean is low and the variance high”.28 It might be hoped that epistocrats exaggerate the
degree of how ignorant, irrational, or misinformed the majority of the public are. To exhaustively
survey all of the studies on the topic and to make a conclusive analysis, however, could be a whole
book unto itself. As such, for the sake of argument, I will simply just assume that the epistocrats are
correctwhen they claim, within reason, that the level of ignorance, irrationality, andmisinformation is
worrying enough to motivate an evaluation between democracy and epistocracy. As I will argue later,
the mere fact of the matter is not enough to demonstrate some irreparable flaw in democracy which
only epistocracy can resolve. It should be also noted that Brennan takes this somewhat fatalistically.
He has a rather pessimistic view of the chances for most people to improve in this regard.
Finally, it is worth clarifying Brennan’s project in Against Democracy. It is clear that he favors
epistocracy over democracy. Brennan introduces his book by stating, “Here I’ll contend that if the
27Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 16.
28Philip E. Converse, “Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information,” in Information and Democratic
Processes, ed. J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
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facts turn out the right way, some people ought not have the right to vote, or ought to have weaker
voting rights than others.”29However, his approach to arriving at this conclusion is somewhat unusual.
Against Democracy has very little elaboration on the benefits of epistocracy or how, precisely, it would
be better-functioning than democracy. Rather, as Brennan says later in the introduction, “In this book,
I won’t try to convince you there is for sure a better alternative. I will argue for a conditional claim,
however: if there turns out to be better [sic] a better-functioning alternative, then we ought to take
it.”30 That is to say, that Brennan seems to be clarifying that the arguments in Against Democracy
should be considered conclusive arguments for epistocracy. The point appears to be that these are
preliminary arguments which ought to motivate a more thorough consideration of epistocracy. In
otherwords, Brennan attempts to lay out the groundwork for a grander evaluation betweendemocracy
and epistocracy.
This groundwork for the evaluation between democracy and epistocracy is made explicit later:
My goal here is not to argue for the strong claim that epistocracy is superior to democracy.
I am instead advocating for weaker claims. For one, if any form of epistocracy, with
whatever realistic flaws it has, turns out to perform better than democracy, we ought to
implement epistocracy instead of democracy. There are also good grounds to presume
that some feasible form of epistocracy would in fact outperform democracy. Finally, if
democracy and epistocracy perform equally well, then we may justly instantiate either
system.31
I take the first claim to be presumed if we are going to engage in this discussion at all. Certainly, it
would be strange to try to motivate consideration of epistocracy by arguing we ought to implement
it because it performs worse than democracy. The claims of note, then, are the second and third:
that there is good grounds to presume that epistocracy would outperform democracy and that if they
29Brennan, Against Democracy, p. viii.
30Ibid., p. 8.
31Ibid., p. 16.
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did equally well wemay instantiate either. These claims, however, go beyondmerely insisting that we
ought to bewilling to entertain the idea of epistocracy. It is to contend that, if the initial considerations
turn out the right way, epistocracy would be either better or as good as democracy. As Brennan would
have it, the initial survey should tip in favor of epistocracy.
In this paper, I will examine these two claims are meant to lead us to believe that epistocracy is
likely to be superior to or just as good as democracy. Since these are not conclusive arguments for
epistocracy, I do not take myself to be making conclusive arguments against epistocracy. I contend
that Brennan’s arguments are not sufficient to motivate his novel approach to justifying epistocracy
as a more promising alternative to the traditional approach. Brennan’s arguments that epistocracy
is likely to perform better than democracy depend on the strategy of showing the flaws of democracy
and presuming that epistocracy is likely to do better in those regards. In assessing the weight of these
arguments, however, it is unclear why we ought to conclude that these arguments against democracy
are not also arguments against epistocracy. Moreover, given that we are evaluating democracy and
epistocracy in a non-ideal framework, it does not seem to be the case that if epistocracy merely per-
formed equally as well that we ought to be indifferent between the two. We must, after all, consider
what sort of costs are entailed in implementing each. While these observations might not be a refuta-
tion of epistocracy, they are instructive of what a persuasive argument for epistocracy ought to look
like. As such, I will show that even in our initial consideration of epistocracy it will not be enough to
merely argue against democracy. In pursuing this, it will also be shown that even if we grant Brennan’s
basic arguments, the initial consideration should favor democracy instead.
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Chapter 2
DEMOCRACY, STULTIFICATION, AND CORRUPTION
2.1 The Kinds of Arguments Against Democracy
For Brennan, it is not enough to show merely that democracy does not make good on the lofty
promises and ideals surrounding it. He argues further. Brennan raises a number of considerations
which he takes to represent the negative costs of democracy. The most significant of these is the
assertion that democracy tends to corrupt and stultify most people. That is to say, the sort of polit-
ical participation which occurs in a democracy is likely to negatively affect the epistemic and moral
characters of most people given the way they are. As such, this presumably presents a negative cost
of democracy which is meant to be counted as a consideration against democracy in our evaluation
between democracy and epistocracy.
In what follows, I will argue that even if we accept that these harms arise from the sort of political
participation which occurs in a democracy, it is entirely unclear howwe are to arrive at the conclusion
that these are weighty considerations against democracy. To put it differently, there is not sufficient
reason to attribute the harms which Brennan identifies as being specifically or exclusively democratic.
As such, Brennan’s identification of stultification and corruption occurring in democracy should not
be counted as a consideration against democracy particularly.
I take this to be an important instructive point about how we ought to assess such arguments in
our project of evaluating between democracy and epistocracy. The primary value in the following anal-
ysis, then, is not in refuting Brennan’s argument but in informing how we should go about assessing
how negative arguments should factor into our consideration. That is to say, the corruption and stul-
tification argument shows us through its refutation what a proper argument in the debate between
democracy and epistocracy ought to look like.
First, some comments on the structure of Brennan’s stultification and corruption argument will
provide some useful context. In Against Democracy, Brennan gives to kinds of objections against
10
democracy. The first kind are arguments that in actual nonideal implementations, democracy does
not generate the benefits which ideal theories claim ought to occur. The second kind are arguments
that democracy generates certain kinds of harm. These two objections aremeant to entrap democrats:
to demonstrate that democracy comes at additional costs compared to epistocracy which cannot be
justified by additional benefit over epistocracy.
Givenwe are trying to evaluate whether democracy or epistocracy is preferable with consideration
to Brennan’s arguments, we are more interested in the second kind of argument. The first kind of
argument largely targets what Brennan called democratic triumphalism. He identifies three possible
ways in which democracy might be valuable:
Epistemic/instrumental: Perhaps democracy and widespread political participation are good
because they tend to lead to just, efficient, or stable outcomes (at least compared to the alterna-
tives).
Aretaic: Perhaps democracy and widespread political participation are good because they tend
to educate, enlighten, and ennoble citizens.
Intrinsic: Perhaps democracy and widespread political participation are good as ends in them-
selves.32
Democratic triumphalism, as Brennan defines it, holds that democracy and widespread political par-
ticipation are valuable, justified, and required by justice for all three reasons.33
It is not clear why we should consider arguments targeted at democratic triumphalism as particu-
larly weighty when we are not necessarily democratic triumphalists. Certainly, I do not take myself to
be defending democratic triumphalism. For one thing, given that Brennan sets out in the beginning of
Against Democracy that he takes is only interested in evaluating between democracy and epistocracy
on instrumental grounds anyway, this rules out a defense of democracy from what he calls intrinsic
reasons. For another thing, democrats need not be democratic triumphalists and advocate democ-
racy for all three reasons. The arguments which Brennan makes against democratic triumphalism
32Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 7.
33Ibid.
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deny that democrats can justify democracy on aretaic and intrinsic grounds. However, I only aim
to defend democracy, in this paper, on the grounds that it tends to lead to just, efficient, or stable
outcomes compared to the alternatives. In which case, arguments against democratic triumphalism
which deny aretaic or intrinsic reasons are not particularly bothersome for an epistemic defense of
democracy.
Further, given that Brennan makes little effort in Against Democracy to make any positive argu-
ment for epistocracy beyond the claim that it avoids the costs of democracy, we are methodologically
constrained to focus only on the second kind of argument. When deciding between options, we eval-
uate the comparative merits and demerits of each and weigh them against each other. So, if we are
deciding between democracy and epistocracy, we have three tasks. First, we must evaluate the com-
parative merits and demerits of democracy. Second, we must evaluate the comparative merits and
demerits of epistocracy. And finally, we must weight the two against each other to see which is the
preferable option.
However, Jason Brennan’s account in Against Democracy is, as the title would suggest, largely
concernedwith a negative argument against democracy. Very little time is spent on evaluating the case
for epistocracy. The positive argument for epistocracy is not explored to any great length. Instead, he
attempts to persuade that epistocracy is likely a better-functioning alternative by demonstrating how
poorly democracy functions. As a result, there are no merits of epistocracy to compare against the
merits of democracy. Therefore, our assessment of democracy will be methodologically constrained
to evaluating the harmswhich Brennan attributes to democracy andwhether or not epistocracy would
likely avoid them. If it seems that epistocracy does not, thenBrennan’s attempt to persuade us towards
epistocracy by arguing against democracy fails.
This is significant given the particular argument against democracywhichwe are examining in this
chapter. Brennan’s stultification and corruption argument is couched in an objection against the edu-
cation argument. That is to say, he begins by arguing that actual, present democracy does not result in
the kind of aretaic benefits which ideal theories claim should occur. For the reasons explained above,
this argument is not of interest for evaluation: not all democrats endorse the education argument
and, even if we do, involving it in our evaluation creates methodological difficulties. The corruption
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and stultification argument claims that democracy generates a kind of harm. It is this particular ar-
gument that we are interested in. However, this argument is couched in the prior argument against
democratic triumphalism in way that is difficult to disentangle the two. Given this, I will reproduce
both of Brennan’s arguments below. I will emphasize again, however, that the objection against the
education is not particularly relevant: even if Brennan is correct in arguing that democracy does not
produce this aretaic benefit, it is another thing entirely to argue that democracy harms the majority
of its participants.
2.2 The Education Argument
Brennan begins with the education argument. The education argument is, in a sense, one of the
first counterarguments to epistocracy. Recall that Mill raises the suggestion of an epistocratic plural
voting scheme where additional votes are awarded upon demonstration of superior knowledge or wis-
dom. Although he introduces this epistocratic scheme, Mill makes the case that universal suffrage
should be adopted at least at first. Mill states that the only choice for representative government will
be between a plural voting scheme based upon knowledge or equal universal suffrage.34 Although
Mill believes universal suffrage is, firstly, not intrinsically good but only relatively good compared to
inequality and, secondly, a wrong and hurtful standard that does not recognize that knowledge and
wisdom ought to bemore entitled to political power than ignorance, he provides a defense of universal
suffrage against the second concern. Mill argues that universal suffrage
is nevertheless, conducive to progress, because the appeals constantly made to less in-
structed classes, the exercise given to their mental powers, and the exertions which the
more instructed are obliged to make for enlightening their judgment and ridding them
of errors and prejudices, are powerful stimulants to their advance in intelligence.35
34Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 206.
35Ibid., p. 211.
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The defense of universal suffrage, then, holds that by allowing even the incompetent to be engage
in political participation, citizens would be become more wise and virtuous.36 This effect could be
interpreted as compensating for not recognizing a principle that knowledge and wisdom should be
given more influence since universal suffrage results in greater knowledge and wisdom.
This argument that political participation would improve citizens’ character andmake themmore
knowledgeable and intelligent is what Brennan calls the education argument. He traces the education
argument back to Mill and gives it a generic form:
1. Civic and political activity requires citizens to take a broad view of others’ interests, and search
for ways to promote the common good. This requires long-term thinking as well as engagement
with moral, philosophical, and social scientific issues.
2. If so, then civic and political activity will tend to improve citizens’ virtue and make them better
informed.
3. Therefore, civic and political activity will tend to improve citizens’ virtue and make them better
informed.37
Significantly, Brennan argues that the education argument is not a philosophical argument but a social
scientific one.38 As he says,“The education argument sounds plausible. But whether the argument is
sound or not depends on what people are like.”39 Ideal theorists, then, cannot defend democracy
appealing to the intuition that the education argument is plausible. Instead, democrats who endorse
the education argument have to observe the nonideal and determine empirically if it is accurate.
Brennan argues that empirical studies show that the education argument does occur. He implicitly
takes it that voting would constitute the “mere” participation which would instantiate the education
argument. What is more, some democracies force citizens to vote while others allow citizens to not
36Mill also observes that plural voting may not be practical at was his present. There is the suggestion that universal
suffrage might be immediately preferable if only as an instrumental step to a plural voting scheme.
37Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 54.
38Ibid., p. 55.
39Ibid.
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participate. In which case, Brennan observes that if the education argument were true we ought to be
able to test it by observing whether or not citizens under democracies with compulsory voting have
greater levels of knowledge compared to citizens under democracies without.40 Citing the work of
Sarah Birch and Annabelle Lever, he concludes that the evidence reveals that compulsory voting has
no significant effect on political knowledge or engagement in politics.41 As a result, democracy fails
this test. The education argument, then, is purely ideal since nonideal democracy fails to produce the
desired aretaic benefit.
2.3 Deliberative Democracy
Brennan anticipates a possible counterargument in defense of the education argument.
Democrats could object that the aretaic benefits claimed by the education argument do not arise
out of the mere act of voting. No one claims that the simple act of casting a ballot in of itself is a reli-
able method of promoting virtue or knowledge. Rather, the education argument identifies the various
kinds of political participation which culminates in a vote as the mechanism which promotes virtue
or knowledge. Mill, after all, identifies the relevant mechanisms as the appeals to the less instructed
and the opportunities for the less instructed to exercise their mental faculties as the stimulants which
advances intelligence, not the exercise of political power.42 Brennan’s test, then, is misleading: it is
not universal voting which would have an affect but universal engagement in politics.
Brennan takes the notion of deliberative democracy to be making such a defense of the education
argument: it is not enough to merely vote, citizens must also deliberate properly for political partici-
pation to have any aretaic or educative benefit. Deliberative democracy is a theory which emphasizes
the ideal where citizens engage in inclusive deliberation in a dispassionate, scientific way in order to
reach a consensus about what ought to be done. It should be stressed that deliberation is being used
40Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 58.
41See Birch, Full Participation; A Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting and Lever, “’A Liberal Defence of Compul-
sory Voting’: Some Reasons for Scepticism”
42Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Chapter 3.
15
to refer to a particular sense. As Brennan notes, “Deliberative democrats don’t just want people to talk
about politics; they want them to deliberate. Deliberation connotes an orderly, reason-guided process.
Deliberative democrats tend to endorse a demanding ideal of howpolitical deliberation ought to go.”43
He cites the rules for proper deliberation which are given by Habermas and Joshua Cohen.44 Suffice
it to say for our purposes that deliberative democrats hold that only a high standard of deliberation
can be expected to instantiate the education argument.
Brennan responds by, again, observing that nonideal democracy lacks this idealized mechanism
of deliberation and, therefore, fails to secure any aretaic or educative benefit. For one thing, Brennan
points out that deliberation in real democracy does not resemble the proposed ideal forms.45 For
another, Brennan argues that whatever deliberation looks like in real democracy, various biases are
likely to turn deliberation into a corrupting and stultifying process.46 This appears to be a sort of
probabilistic argument; given the nature of how people are, they are unlikely to approach deliberation
with the requisite attitude or in a rational and objective way and are more likely to be partisan and
subjective. Lastly, Brennan surveys a number of studies and concludes that the evidence is conclusive:
actual deliberation fails.47 What is more, he claims that it conclusively shows that actual deliberation
produces negative results. For the sake of argument, I will let Brennan’s interpretation of the evidence
stand although it should be noted that his interpretation could be reasonably contested.48
43Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 59.
44See Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action and Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legiti-
macy”
45Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 58.
46Ibid., p. 62.
47Ibid., p. 66.
48It is, at least, open to question. Christiano puts it well in a review of Against Democracy:
Brennan tends systematically to overplay the negative evidence and underplay the more positive evidence.
The researchers that he refers to in support of his claims tend to take much more nuanced positions than
Brennan does. The evidence on deliberation is usually described as “mixed”, not as all or even mostly neg-
ative. It is negative relative to the hopes of some deliberative theorists perhaps. But the researchers seem
to see a fair amount of positive effects of deliberation and they emphasize the sensitivity of the quality of
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These are, however, merely observations of real, present democracy. While both relevant and
suggestive, they do not serve as sufficient refutation of what might be possible—even nonideally. In-
deed, Brennan admits “Deliberative democrats can rightly assert that the research hasn’t falsified
their views, because people aren’t deliberating properly.”49 However, he attempts to resist this by
trivializing the deliberative democrats’ defense with a self-admitted parody defense of college frater-
nities:“that [it is] not much different from stating, ‘Sure, actual fraternities mess men up, but proper
fraternities would improve their character and scholarship.’”50 This is not an entirely satisfactory re-
sponse.
Deliberative democrats can hold that they are not defending present democracy but a possible
democracy which does practice proper deliberation. To some degree, Brennan admits this response:
“Now perhaps in the future a political scientist will discover a form of participation that in fact tends to
ennoble most people, and could be implemented without abuse on a large scale.”51 He responds only
with the charge “That day hasn’t yet come.”52 It is clear that he perceives the kind of proper delibera-
tion suggested by deliberative democrats to be an objection kind of ideal theory reliant upon ideal-as-
idealized-models. That is to say, the ideal of proper deliberation is too unfeasible given our nonideal
circumstance that deliberative democracy’s defense of the education argument is insufficient.
While I broadly agree with this response to this defense of the education argument, it should be
remembered that our project is not defending the education argument but assessing how the corrup-
tion and stultification argument should impact our evaluation between democracy and epistocracy.
Brennan presents the corruption and stultification argument as a kind of extension of his counter-
deliberation to context and recommend that the design of deliberative institutions take this into account.
(Christiano, Against Democracy)
My own reading of the studies which Brennan cites leads me to lend more credence to Christiano than to Brennan. I will
leave it at that, however, since it is not central to the corruption and stultification argumentwhichwe are primarily interested
in here.
49Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 70.
50Ibid., p. 73.
51Ibid.
52Ibid.
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argument to deliberative democracy and the education argument. Given the brief amount of time
he spends on the corruption and stultification argument relative to the education argument, it might
seem as though the importance of the corruption and stultification argument is being exaggerated
were it not for the fact that he refers to its conclusion through Against Democracy. As such, hopefully
the brief summary of the debate over the education argument will provide useful context for under-
standing the corruption and stultification argument.
2.4 The Stultification and Corruption Argument
Brennan introduces the stultification and corruption argument as another reason to object to
the defense of the education argument made by deliberative democracy. He supposes that even if
it were the case that deliberation fails to produce any benefit, we might suppose that it is at least not
harmful.53 Deliberation, or at least the sort of deliberation we see out in the world, produces neutral
results.54 Brennan contends that “a neutral result is usually a negative one. If people deliberate to-
gether, but this fails to educate or enlighten them, then this means they are actually worse off as a
result of deliberation.”55 In which case, the corruption and stultification argument is a distinct kind
of argument from his objection to the education argument. The claim that democracy actually harms
is not a mere extension of the objection that democracy does not produce the benefits theorists claim
it does.
As such, the prior observations of present democracy are not explanatory of Brennan’s complaint
against democracy. They show that deliberation in present democracy fails to achieve what some
democrats hope for. They do not show or explain how it is that deliberation results in the stultification
or moral corruption of most citizens. Thankfully, Brennan also provides a philosophical, although
53Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 67.
54Interestingly, he notes that researchers often present their findings in this way. This seems to contradict his conclusive
interpretation of the evidence.
55Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 67.
18
fairly brief, argument which illuminates how his interpretation of these empirical studies results in
this strong claim.
The explanation of the corruption and stultification argument begins with an epistemological ar-
gument. Brennan’s argument is made from the following example:
Imagine a child has led a sheltered life, with no exposure to history, geology, biology,
physics, or cosmology. They believe on the basis of their young Earth creationist parents’
testimony, that the universe is six thousand years old and that all animalswere created six
thousand years ago. But suppose this child then takes sixteen years of classes in history,
geology, biology, physics, and cosmology. Along the way, they get to sequence DNA, re-
create Gregor Mendel’s pea experiment, handle fossils, and the like. After sixteen years
of intense study, though, suppose they continue to believe the world is six thousand years
old and that all animals were created as they currently are.56
Brennan argues that in this case the person has become worse off from an epistemological standpoint.
From the premise that what it is rational to believe depends upon all the available evidence, rationality
required that this person changes their mind. As he points out, after sixteen years of study, their
beliefs are now much less justified. Since this person did not change their mind, they have violated
their epistemic duties. Moreover, Brennan charges that they have added further wrongdoing to their
“epistemic tally sheet” and that they are now more epistemically delinquent.57 Brennan claims is that
their epistemological character or status as an epistemic agent is tarnished as a result of their failure
to adjust their belief accordingly to new evidence.58
56Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 68.
57Ibid.
58The supposition of an epistemic tally sheet makes this claim somewhat dubious. It is a peculiar picture of what is
presumably virtue. Wemight well wonder if it is simply the nature of the burdens of judgments and the process of education
that mistakes are inevitably made. On the other hand, it should be noted that this argument bears a striking resemblance
to an argument in Nomi Arpaly’s Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency which argues that, after evidence to
the contrary, continuing to endorse a sexist belief is no longer excusable. We might suppose that an argument more akin to
Arpaly’s which does not suggest some tally sheet of virtue might be more plausible.
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Brennan argues that this example parallels what happens during deliberation. He observes that
in most deliberation, most citizens encounter new information. He also supposes that they are likely
to learn that other, well-informed people disagree with them. In either case, he presumes that they
should revise their beliefs as a result of deliberation. Brennan asserts that “citizens shouldweigh other
citizens’ testimony on the basis of how expert, reasonable, and reliable these citizens are likely to be,
and revise their own beliefs accordingly.”59 Again, in parallel to the creationist example, Brennan
takes it that when citizens fail to behave according to these rules, they are not acting rationally and
they are made worse from an epistemic point of view. This so far accounts for the stultifying effects
of deliberation.
It is clear that Brennan believes that this epistemological argument applies to deliberation in
democracy; that people are not following their epistemic duties and are not rationally changing their
beliefs in light of new testimony or evidence.60 After all, Brennan repeatedly insists that democracy
is likely to result in stultification and corruption. However, Brennan does not continue this line of
argument any further. He does not clarify to what extent he believes deliberation results in this stul-
tification.
After all, proof that most citizens fail to carry out their epistemic duties cannot merely be that
they are not changing their minds. While there are structural parallels between Brennan’s creationist
example and deliberation, it should be apparent that the creationist example is far more extreme and
exaggerated. Unless some instance or even set of instances of deliberation convey the same amount
of information sixteen years of what Brennan describes as intense study does, we cannot expect such
similarly dramatic results. What is more, different epistemic standpoints modulate the way infor-
mation is processed that is not immediately obvious to others. It may be that credences ought to be
adjusted, but not necessarily to the degree in which someone transitions from belief to non-belief.
59Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 68.
60It is worth considering whether most people are even aware of their epistemic duties in the first place. It is likely that
these duties must be taught rather than intuited. Consider that most people are taught to form certain beliefs in contradic-
tion to most articulations of epistemic norms. After all, many are raised within a religion and, as a result, impressed upon
with the religious duty to have faith. Faith seems to conflict with typical epistemic norms. This may suggest that education
of epistemic duties and when they should be adhered to may help.
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Furthermore, it cannot merely be the assertion that most are not responsive to deliberation. The
empirical literature which Brennan cites notes that people do modify their credences in response to
deliberation; there are, in fact, a variety of different responses observed.61 For example, one of the
observed responses which Brennan takes as a failure of deliberation is the observation that “deliber-
ation frequently causes deliberators to doubt there is a correct position at all. This leads to moral or
political skepticism or nihilism.”62,63 This is a response to deliberation. What is more,this sort of re-
sponse should be unsurprising. Earlier, Brennan cites the literature on epistemic disagreement when
he argues that we ought to adjust our credences in response to testimony from experts. But this very
same literature is interested in what happens in disagreement between epistemic peers. Often, it is
argued that rationality required that in such cases, one ought to suspend judgment or exercise a kind
of skepticism about whether or not either belief is correct.64 In which case, if the majority of delibera-
tion occurs between epistemic peers and not between obvious epistemic inferiors and superiors, then
this observed reaction of doubt in response is quite in accordance with rationality. Which is to say,
that at least this observed behavior which Brennan takes as detrimental to the deliberative democrats’
position does not necessarily entail that rationality is ignored or epistemic duties are ignored. Thus,
this empirical observation is not necessarily an observation of epistemic harm or stultification.
To whatever extent this stultification which Brennan describes occurs, he argues that there is also
an associated corruption: a corruption of citizens’ moral status. This harm is parallel to that of his
61Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 63–66.
62Ibid., p. 65.
63This is apparently what is reported by David Ryfe who merely states that “Other studies have shown that delibera-
tion can cause participants to doubt that a ‘correct’ decision is available at all.” (David Ryfe, “Does Deliberative Democracy
Work?,” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): p. 54) This claim is in turned informed by two studies which say
nothing about moral or political skepticism or nihilism at all (Armor and Taylor, “The effects of mindset on behavior: self-
regulation in deliberative and implementational frames of mind”; Iyengar and Lepper, “When Choice is demotivating: can
one desire too much of a good thing?”). It is unclear, to me at least, how the empirical evidence demonstrates that delib-
eration leads to moral or political skepticism or nihilism if the cited empirical evidence doesn’t track the presence of those
beliefs or make mention of observing it at all. This is one example which leads me, like Christiano, to question Brennan’s
interpretation of the empirical evidence.
64See the equal weight arguments on the topic of peer disagreement: Bogardus, “A Vindication of the Equal-Weight
View”; Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”; Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement”; Feldman,
“Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement”; Matheson, “Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief”
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account of stultification. Brennan asserts that “deliberative democrats usually hold that the rules
of proper deliberation are moral.”65 That is to say, that there is a moral duty to conform to proper
deliberative procedure. As he says, “The citizen has added furthermoral wrongdoings to their lifetime
moral tally sheet.”66 In which case, Brennan argues that when citizens are not deliberating properly,
like what he describes as occurring in his account of stultification, they have become more defective
morally.
Out of these two arguments, Brennan concludes that it would be better if citizens were never
engaged in deliberation at all, that “they remain ignorant and apathetic.”67 There are various avenues
of resistance to Brennan’s arguments and conclusions made here. This is a strange account of virtue
which seems to argue too much; it is like claiming that a child should remain child-like rather than
risk committing the mistakes which are inevitable in the process of maturing into an adult. His moral
corruption argument, this harmagainst themoral character ofmost citizens, rests upon the contingent
belief that the rules of deliberation are moral. It is unclear how many are committed to this belief;
while he takes it that this is an argument against democracy generally, he also notes that this belief is
associated with deliberative democrats specifically. At any rate, it is unclear why deliberationmust be
morally normative rather than normative in some other non-moral dimension. Further, it is unclear
why bias and irrationality should be construed as the degradation of epistemic status. Unless we hold
a rose-tinted and naive view of human beings, people are not fully rational all the time. It is unclear
why this irrationality is a fault of democracy rather than an observation of just how people are. Indeed,
if one of the arguments against democracy turns upon the claim that it is simply a fact that people are
irrational, it seems circular to then argue that this displayed irrationality is also a result of democracy.
However, I will not pursue these arguments here. Instead, I will argue that even if we suppose that
Brennan is correct in identifying these harms and the mechanisms from which they arise, there is no
reason why we should treat them as being particularly weighty against democracy.
65Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 69.
66Ibid.
67Ibid., p. 73.
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2.5 Is This a Democratic Harm?
Indeed, it is not clear why Brennan’s arguments should be understood as being about democracy
specifically in the first place. The harms which Brennan identifies, that most people become stultified
and morally corrupted, arise from a specific mechanism which Brennan has also identified. That is,
since most people are ignorant, irrational, and misinformed, most people will not engage in forms of
political participation like deliberation in the proper ways. As a result of this improper engagement,
they instead engage in the sort of behavior which supposedly detracts from their epistemic and moral
status. In other words, Brennan’s harms arise out of the interaction of two factors: the way people are
and political participation.
If these arguments are meant to be particularly weighty against democracy, we might expect that
the kind of harms which democracy generates arise out of factors unique to democracy itself. In such
a case, it would be clear why democracy is not only problematic but problematic in a way in which
other forms of government are not. Since such factors are unique to democracy, other forms of gov-
ernment would not share those factors and, hence, not share the mechanism by which these harms
are generated. Therefore, the identification of such harms would in fact be weighty considerations
against democracy particularly.
However the factors which generate Brennan’s harms are not unique to democracy. The two fac-
tors in question—the way that people are and political participation—are not by their nature specific
to democracy. The universality of the first factor should be plain. The fact that people are generally
ignorant, irrational, and misinformed is something which Brennan takes to be, presumably, a fact of
the world. It is not the case that democracies are some how uniquely comprised of more ignorant, ir-
rational, and misinformed people. It must be the case that in, for example, an epistocracy that people
are also generally ignorant, irrational, and misinformed or there would be no reason for epistocracy.
As such, if we take it that it is a fact for democracies that people are generally ignorant, irrational, and
misinformed then this ought to be a universal fact for all forms of government. Simply put, the way
that people are is not a unique feature of democracy.
In which case, we might then wonder about the uniqueness, or lack thereof, of the second factor.
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If the definition of political participation is understood to be more or less the ways by which a public
attempts to express its opinions and to influence decision-making about political affairs, then there are
innumerable activities which would be taken to be political participation. The gamut of such activities
would have to include conventional actions such as voting, demonstrating, contacting public officials,
boycotting, attending political rallies, posting blogs, volunteering, signing petitions, buying fair-trade
products to the unconventional like guerrilla gardening, joining flash mobs, or even suicide protests.
While we like to think of democracy as expanding the scope of political participation, political
participation itself is hardly unique to democracy. Certainly, some forms of political participation are
characteristically associated with democracy like voting. Democracy as a form of government is de-
fined by certain forms of political participation. The state authorizes, and is legitimized, by political
participation. However, even when states attempt to constrain political participation, there remain
various forms of political participation left available. Not all forms, after all, must be authorized or
seen as legitimate by the state. Dissident forms of political participation like protest, strikes, or revolt
are available regardless the form of state government. Furthermore, some forms of political participa-
tion may be, by their nature, difficult to eliminate. Deliberation, for example, requires nothing more
than conversation. Unless a state installs telescreens everywhere and maintains a constant surveil-
lance of every citizens private life, deliberation will be impossible to track much less regulate. There
remains the possibility for at least some level of political participation in all forms of government,
then.
Granted, it might be argued that this is an uncharitable reading. We ought to not consider any
and all forms of political participation but only uniquely democratic forms of political participation:
for example, voting. If it were the case that uniquely democratic forms of political participation were
necessary factors in generating the sort of harms identified by Brennan, then there may be some con-
siderations against democracy in particular. Alternatively, it might suggested that democracy simply
promotes forms of political participation such that they become routine, pervasive, or even institu-
tionalized where they otherwise would not be.
However, the particularly democratic form of political participation which Brennan identifies—
voting—does not sustain this line of argument. While Brennan does discuss this form of political
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participation, it is only in his response to the education argument. His argument that voting itself fails
to affect political knowledge may be a weighty consideration against the sort of theories put forward
by democratic triumphalists. However, demonstrating that democracy does not generate a hoped for
benefit is not the same as demonstrating that democracies generates a harm. Brennan never argues
that voting itself results in corruption and stultification. The only specifically democratic form of
political participation, then, is not even suggested to be a factor in generating harm.
Rather, the form of political participation which Brennan identifies in his corruption and stulti-
fication argument is deliberation. Brennan discusses deliberation as if it were somehow particularly
democratic. While he is initially concerned with the specific sense of deliberation which deliberative
democrats refer to when discussing what deliberation is, the kind of deliberation which is discussed
in the corruption and stultification argument is hardly this ideal deliberation. The subject of Brennan
argument is simply common, everyday deliberation. It is unclear, however, how common delibera-
tion can be construed as uniquely democratic. Deliberation is one of those universal forms of political
participation. Even if we perceive it as being characteristically associated with democracy, it is not
unique to democracy.
As such, it does not appear that the second factor—political participation—provides a more solid
grounding for identifying these harms as being particular to democracy. Wemight then also consider
the possible response that while epistocracy might suffer from the same sort of harms as democracy,
it somehow does so less egregiously. That is to say, while epistocracy might share the same factors,
and therefore the samemechanism, behind the sort of harms which Brennan identifies in democracy,
perhaps it generates those harms to a lesser degree. It might be hoped that by distributing political
power away from the sort of people most vulnerable to stultification and corruption would conse-
quently reduce their engagement in political participation. This is to suggest, however, that people
are less willing to talk about the various political decisions which affect their everyday lives to their
peers in common conversation when they have less political power. This seems unlikely. Deliberation
is typically a preliminary step to further escalation of political participation. Unless the long history
of protests, uprisings, and rebellions which plague non-democratic states are in fact the coinciden-
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tal confluence of fate which brought large numbers of independent actors to do the same thing at the
same time in the same place, then presumably people deliberated about politics without democracy.68
This presents a dilemma for epistocrats. I imagine that there are two sorts of epistocratic re-
sponses along these lines each associated with the two kinds of epistocracy which I discussed in Chap-
ter 1. First we can examine a radical epistocratic response which attempts to eliminate the forms of
political participation from which these supposedly democratic harms arise. Obviously, this would
entail stripping the right to vote from those determined to be unwise, irrational, or incompetent. This
and this alone, however, is not enough to address the harms identified by Brennan. Given that stul-
tification and corruption arise out of forms of political participation other than voting, then a radical,
epistocratic responsewould bemoved to also constrain those apparently problematic focus of political
participation in question.
This is all to say that an epistocracy which would be advantaged over democracy in this regard
would have to restrict far more than just voting. The form of political participation which Brennan
identifies at work in generating the harms in questions is democratic deliberation. Moreover, it is un-
clear how deliberation can be distinguished as democratic in a substantive way relevant to the mech-
anism behind this problem. Rather, deliberation is ultimately just deliberation regardless of how it is
contextualized, conducted, or encouraged by or within a democracy. Indeed, it is a crucial point for
Brennan’s account of stultification and corruption that most people fail to deliberate in a way which
deliberative democrats deem to be proper. Which is to say, they merely deliberate.
It might be hoped that by distributing political power away from the sort of people most vulner-
able to stultification and corruption would consequently reduce their engagement in the other forms
of political participation like deliberation. But the sort of people who are the most vulnerable—the
most unwise, most irrational, or most incompetent—are the sort of people least likely to exercise their
political power in the first place.69 As such, it seems that there are two likely results from this line of
argument. It could be that when people are not exercising their political power they are less likely to
68It might be suggested that such drastic actions occur relatively rarely and, hence, deliberation was not pervasive. How-
ever, such dramatic action is just the tip of the iceberg: for less costly action like deliberation will be more common.
69Brennan, Against Democracy, FIND.
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engage in other forms of political participation like deliberation. In which case, it seems that stulti-
fication and corruption are to some degree self-regulating or self-mitigating in a democracy anyway
since the unwise, irrational, or incompetent tend not to vote. If the majority of people abstained from
voting, then introducing constraints by the state may be an unnecessary overreach. Alternatively, it is
likely that even when they do not exercise political power, most people remain engaged in other, more
banal, forms of political participation like deliberation. Peoplemaintain an interest and investment in
political decisions which affect them even if they cannot shape them; enough, anyway, to keep them
talking about it. In that case, in order for an epistocracy to not share these harms, the state must
restrict more forms of political participation from the majority of its citizens beyond just voting.
Moreover, constraining the scope of deliberation or other similar forms of political participation
in such a way which would avoid these harms would require an extremely invasive state. By avoiding
the kind of costs incurred by democracy which are identified by Brennan, it is likely that a radical
epistocracy would incur a more egregious kind of cost. The subject is, unfortunately, never broached.
As such we are left to speculate just how it is a state might be able to prevent the majority of its pop-
ulation like mere deliberation. In this light, it is hard to see how this is a more palatable alternative
(if we even think Brennan identifies real costs to begin with). An attempt by the state to constrain
apparently problematic deliberation about politics by most of its private citizens would likely come at
a price in a variety of personal liberties.
Unsurprisingly, and as Brennan would probably be quick to point out, the epistocracies which
he proposes are not the sort described above. They offer a moderate epistocratic response. Unlike
the radical epistocratic responses, which looked for solutions in the further constraint of political
participation, moderate epistocratic responses ostensibly address the problem of stultification and
corruption without severely limiting other forms of political participation besides voting, if at all. Fur-
thermore, that they do so in a way which is also ostensibly epistocratic and not democratic.70 As such,
a moderate epistocratic response would avoid the objections associated with the solution offered by a
radical epistocratic response.
70As I will discuss in further detail later on, a number of the forms of government which Brennan propose blur the line
between democracy and epistocracy (besides the one he outright admits does so). In fact, given Brennan’s clear and simple
definition of epistocracy, a number of them appear to me to be democracies.
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However, merely avoiding the objections that the sort of solutions offered by a radical epistocratic
response is not enough. An epistocratic responsemust be able to address the issues raised by Brennan
in the first place. After all, we are presently engaged in determining how Brennan’s identification of
the two hours of stultification and corruption should weigh in our evaluation. If the sort of epistoc-
racies proposed by Brennan are also vulnerable to the same sort of objection which are raised about
democracy, then these objections cannot enter into our evaluation between the two as being particu-
larly weighty against one or the other, even if they were valid. Having said this, while Brennan gives
some detail about what we can expect from the sort of epistocracy he’s interested in, it is not clear how
a moderate epistocratic response can address these problems more satisfactorily than democracy.
We can start with Brennan’s first suggestion. What Brennan calls a restricted suffrage epistocracy
or elite electoral system is classically epistocratic. A restricted suffrage epistocracy would restrict
political power to only those citizens who have demonstrated whatever is determined to be a “basic
level of knowledge”.71 Various options are given as to how this might be done. One suggests that
potential voterswould have to pass a voter qualification exam. Another grants the vote to everyone but
imposes a fairly substantial monetary penalty on votes cast by those who have yet to qualify. Lastly, a
plural voting scheme is discussed where additional votes are granted to the default one if some further
qualification is demonstrated.72 Significant to our present inquiry is Brennan’s characterization of a
restricted suffrage epistocracy:73 “Everyone begins as as an equal in this system. By default, no one
is entitled or permitted to exercise any degree of political power. They have extensive civil liberties
to exercise political speech, publish political ideas, protest, and so on, but not to vote.”74 Political
participation, so long as it is not voting, is preserved even under a restricted suffrage epistocracy.
As wemight expect of a moderate epistocratic response, a restricted suffrage epistocracy does not
attempt to address these problems by further constraining other forms of political participation. As
71Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 211.
72Ibid., p. 211-213.
73Brennan speaks as if it were the first type but presumably the basic shape of it is true for all.
74Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 211.
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Brennan notes, it allows for extensive civil liberties. Notably, this includes the freedom to exercise
political speech and to publish political ideas. While this avoids potential concerns about the cost
to civil liberties, it also does little to address the harms identified by Brennan. There is no reason
why we ought to expect less stultification or corruption to occur in a restricted epistocracy than in a
democracy.
As described above, stultification and corruption are generated by the interaction of two factors:
theway that people are and their engagement in forms of political participation like deliberation about
political subjects. Given that Brennan founds his entire account upon the first factor, it seems that
he treats this as a kind of constant. He takes a dim view about on what can be done about it. Thus,
in order to address this problem, we have to disrupt the mechanism by managing the second factor.
But in this form of epistocracy, various civil liberties are permitted. More significantly, the ability to
exercise political speech and publish political ideas are specified. From these it seems that, short of
some complicated contortions, deliberation about politics must also be permitted. This is all to say,
that citizens, most of whomBrennan argues are incompetent, are just as free to deliberate over politics
in a restricted suffrage epistocracy as they are in a democracy. It would follow, then, that a restricted
suffrage epistocracy would stultify and corrupt the character of most of its citizens in the same way
democracy apparently does.75
We can then examine the second of Brennan’s proposed epistocracies. He offers, with some reser-
vations, Claudio López-Guerra’s enfranchisement lottery.76 Under this system, votes go through two
processes. There is a lottery by which all but a random sample of the population are disenfranchised.
This small sample of the pre-voters are then put through a competence-building process in order to
optimize their knowledge about the options on the ballot. Only after this process are the selected then
able to vote. The point of this system is to “breed” the most competent voters rather than merely
75It might be suggested that a restricted suffrage epistocracy merely permits its citizens to stultify and corrupt them-
selves unlike a democracy which causes it as an effect of encouraging deliberation. Briefly, this is unpersuasive for a couple
of reasons. If, as Brennan says, we are examining this from a purely instrumental perspective, then the end result are func-
tionally identical. Additionally, Brennan does suggest that a restricted suffrage epistocracy ought to encourage the poor and
disadvantaged to become good voters. This will, ultimately, result in encouraging deliberation to some degree as well.
76see López-Guerra, “The Enfranchisement Lottery”
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screening them out.77 Relevant for our present purposes is the competence-building process. In this
process, the pre-voters gather into relatively small groups and, as Brennan describes it, “engage in
various deliberative forums with one another, and are asked to study party platforms and the like.”78
Again, we are presented with a form of epistocracy which does not address the issues Brennan has
raised. Indeed, it could be worse depending upon how likely we think the competence-building pro-
cess is to work. If we are particularly pessimistic about the chances of most people to ever deliberate
about politics in a proper way, then it seems this system would forcibly put a portion of its population
at an increased risk of stultification and corruption. While Brennan admits he takes a dim view about
its chances, it is unclear whether or not it is sufficient for what is described above.
At any rate, the enfranchisement lottery is likely permissive of deliberation about politics among
both the pre-voters and those excluded by the sortition. As such, this form of epistocracy is as vulner-
able to concerns about stultification and corruption as democracy for the reasons detailed earlier. If
the intention to breed competent voters is taken seriously, then deliberation may even be encouraged
in the same way deliberative democrats do. Wemight expect children to engage in mock competence-
building process in the classroom much like they do with mock trials or Model UN. Furthermore, by
being as permissive and as encouraging as democracy about deliberation but by also organizing it in
what could be called centralized control, the enfranchisement lottery mitigates none of the harms as-
sociated with deliberation but also introduces an increased risk of manipulation and agenda control.
Along this line of concern, then, this form of epistocracy is as bad, if not worse, than democracy.
Finally, we can discuss the last two kinds of epistocracy Brennan proposes since the analysis will
be the same. First, Brennan proposes what he initially calls a “hybrid political system”. This system,
termed universal suffrage with epistocratic veto, would have “the same political bodies and institu-
tions we find in contemporary democracies. It has unrestricted, equal, universal suffrage. All citizens
77It is this point which Brennan has certain reservations. Given his pessimism on the prospect of improving the way
that people are, it is unsurprising that he doubts that competence can be bred in a reasonably short period of time. I am
inclined to agree with the latter if not the former. At any rate, the enfranchisement lottery appears to contradict one of the
premises of this discussion. As a result, I will not spend much time on it.
78Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 213.
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have equal rights to run for office and vote. The fair value of these political liberties is guaranteed.”79
In addition, Brennan supposes that there is an epistocratic council. This council would be a formally
epistocratic deliberative body comprised of citizens who have demonstrated their competence. Fur-
thermore, this council would have no power to make law but could exercise veto power over political
decisions made by the general electorate or representation which are deemed to be malicious, incom-
petent, or unreasonable. This system, then, might be briefly summarized as a democracy with the
epistocratic equivalent of judicial review.
Next, Brennan proposes a system he describes as government by simulated oracle. Under this sys-
tem, the political decision-making process is an estimation ofwhat the electoratewould have preferred
had they all been competent. Citizens are allowed to vote as they would under a democracy. How-
ever, as they vote they also give their demographic information and demonstrate their competence
on objective political knowledge, basic history, and social sciences. Given this data, some statistical
calculation is made whereby we simulate what the enlightened public would have said. Notably, no
other institutional changes are suggested. Like universal suffrage with epistocratic veto, this appears
to be compatible with the kinds of democratic institutions we already have. Given that no further
institutions are detailed, I presume that like universal suffrage with epistocratic veto, government by
simulated oracle is also an epistocratic modification of present democracy.
Our analysis of how these two ostensibly epistocracies compare with democracy regarding Bren-
nan’s issue of stultification and corruption should at this point be obvious. Given that these systems
are essentially a democracy with a veneer of epistocracy pasted on top, it is hard to see how an osten-
sibly epistocratic response can be formulated. The various forms of political participation which were
held to be harmful in a democracy are untouched in these epistocracies. Merely adding epistocratic-
like features does nothing to disrupt themechanismwhichBrennanhas described that generates these
harms. While offering forms of “epistocracy”which strongly resemble present democracy and ask very
little may be rhetorically useful in avoiding the sort of objections raised against more radical episto-
cratic forms, it undermines arguments like Brennan’s stultification and corruption argument which
are meant to motivate our attraction to epistocracy int he first place. If the considerations raised
79Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 215.
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against democracy are to be taken seriously, then those same considerations ought to hold against
these epistocracies as well.
All in all, Brennan’s complaint should not enter into our evaluation as being particularly weighty
against democracy. He is faced with a dilemma. Either, the sort of moderate epistocracies which he
proposes are just as vulnerable to those same objections he raises against democracy. Or, epistocrats
must turn to radical epistocracy which comes at a greater, objectionable cost in civil liberties which
potentially outweighs the alleged harms which Brennan is concerned with. The result is that in our
evaluation we should either count Brennan’s argument as being neutral given that it applies to both
democracy and epistocracymore or less equally or as possibly negative against epistocracy if we adopt
a radical epistocracy. Even if Brennan is correct in identifying that democracy generates these harms,
which, having made our argument, is doubtful, merely making an argument against democracy is not
enough to argue for epistocracy.
2.6 The Methodology of Judging the Prettiest Pig
It is interesting that Brennan gives the following metaphor.
Political scientistMichaelMunger has a thought experiment that exposes a commonmis-
take people make when reasoning about institutions. Imagine the state fair decides to
hold a “Big Pretty Pig” contest. There end up being only two entries. While there are lots
of big pigs and plenty of pretty pigs, few pigs are both big and pretty. The judge takes a
long look at the first pig and exclaims, “My God, that’s one ugly pig! you know what, let’s
just give the prize to the second one.”
The judge’s mistake is clear. The second pig might be even uglier.80
As Brennan recognizes, even if democracy is uglier than we thought, we still must examine how ugly
epistocracy is before drawing a conclusion as to which is the prettiest pig. In terms of this metaphor,
80Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 205.
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then, Brennan declares that all he argues is that “If epistocracy, warts and all, performs at all bet-
ter than democracy, warts and all, then we should have epistocracy. I’m not arguing, and need not
argue, that epistocracy will be wart free.”81 In other words, we are tasked with evaluating the cumu-
lative weight of all the arguments for and against democracy against the cumulative weight of all the
arguments for and against epistocracy in order to arrive at an assessment of which is better. The
corruption and stultification argument is just one of those arguments which Brennan submits to be
assessed against democracy.
The problem is that Brennan fails to consider whether or not epistocracy has the same kind of
warts as democracy. Since epistocracy is vulnerable to the same complaint Brennan levies against
democracy, it is not a weighty objection against democracy in our consideration. We can see, then,
that when evaluating between two competing options, it is not enough to argue that one has flaws.
For a comparison to conclude that one option is better than the other, it must be shown further that
one has flaws that the other does not. In such a case then an assessment that one is preferable can be
made. If both options demonstrate the same flaw, then both options are equally as bad and, at least
in regard to the flaw in question, there is no reason to view one option as superior to the other.
As such, in the deliberation between democracy and epistocracy, arguments made in favor or
against one must also be applied to the other in order to make any assessment. Brennan’s failure to
do so instructs us on how this debate ought to be conducted. The problem with the corruption and
stultification argument is a methodological one. In evaluating between democracy and epistocracy,
we must evaluate holistically how positive and negative arguments apply to both options. Failure to
do so obfuscates our inquiry.
81Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 223.
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Chapter 3
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC ENEMIES
3.1 Against Politics
In Against Democracy, Brennan devotes the last chapter to an account of how politics makes us
enemieswith one another. The extent towhich this account is intended to be against democracy per-se
is a question of interpretation. Even so, I believe it will be best to spend a brief time on how Brennan’s
account against politics might factor into our evaluation between democracy and epistocracy. It will,
again, emphasize how arguments submitted into our comparison ought to be assessed. As such, I
will sketch out how this account against politics might be taken to be an argument against democracy.
After which, I will argue why, at the minimum, Brennan’s account here is likely inclusive as well as
suggesting how, at themost, it may count against epistocracy should we allow that there are epistemic
injustices beyond prejudice.
Before that, it may be worth discussing the context in which Brennan’s account against politics
takes place inAgainst Democracy. There is a possible interpretationwhich reads this account as being
independent to the rest of the book. In some places it seems to be merely ancillary; as he summarizes
in the first chapter, it “is a short postscript”.82 Indeed, Brennan is, mostly, good at specifying through-
out the chapter that he is talking about politics. At first glance, then, the subject of the account is
something else entirely different from everything preceding it. It might seem reasonable to interpret
all this as evidence that the account against politics is separate from the account against democracy.
Nonetheless, I suggest it is worth spending time on a possible digression for two reasons. First,
Brennan makes it clear that he regards this account as integral to Against Democracy. In the preface,
he states that “what became one of the major themes of this book [is that] politics is bad for us, and
most of us should, for the sake of our characters, minimize our involvement.”83 This suggests that
82Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 22.
83Ibid., p. viii.
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the chapter is not intended to be an ancillary postscript if it is one of the major themes of the book.
Moreover, he mentions briefly that the working title of the book was Against Politics. This account,
even if it is a separate but major theme of the book, illuminates Brennan’s account against democracy
by further contextualizing it.
Notice, it is evident that Brennan conceptualizes his account against politics closely related to
his account against democracy.84 The following quotation is revealing: “I see politics as doing the
opposite: it pulls us apart, stultifies and corrupts us, and makes us civic enemies.”85 In the chapter
which takes politics as its subject matter, Brennanmakes the argument that it makes us civic enemies.
The claims about stultification and corruption, however, are not argued for in an account against
politics specifically. Although, it is certainly familiar.
Which brings us to the second reason; it also seems reasonable for Brennan’s account against pol-
itics to be read as part of his account against democracy at a first glance or for his account against
politics to immediately inspire an account against democracy. As we have seen above, Brennan dis-
cusses the two in such a way that it is confusing to see how Brennan distinguishes between the two.
Further, it could be interpreted that the subject remains democracy. Take for instance how the claim
that politics makes us genuine enemies is introduced: “The structure of democratic politics actually
give me reason to despise most of my politically active fellow citizens—even, I’ll argue, most of the
citizens who share my political beliefs.” Alternatively, consider the way which Brennan presents a
critical part of his demonstration that politics makes us civic enemies: “In the next few sections, I
argue that the following features of the democratic political decision-making process tend to make
us situational enemies…”86 Given the way he characterizes these features when he introduces them,
one might be led to believe that these are particular features to democracy. At the very least, the way
84Brennan is somewhat vague as to what he means by politics specifically. It seems to be the broad understanding of
being involved, even peripherally, with the process of making decisions that apply to members of a group. That is to say,
whatever takes as its subject the affairs of governance.
85Brennan, Against Democracy, p. vii.
86Ibid., p. 237.
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Brennan discusses politics emphasizes the nature of politics in democracies rather than the nature of
politics in general.
Given that the two accounts are so adjacent, it is by nomeans a stretch to suppose that the account
against politics is a part of the account against democracy even if Brennan does not explicitlymake the
case. However, my point here is not simply that the reader may be confused. Rather, it is easy to see
how this account against politics can inspire an argument against democracy. If Brennan’s account
of the nature of politics is taken to be persuasive, then we might be moved to, as he puts it, “argue
that for this reason, all things considered, we should wait to expand the scope of civil society and
reduce the sphere of politics.”87 If, further, democracy is seen as somehow being especially political
or burdened with politics—a point which I am skeptical of—then it may be reasoned that democracy
exacerbates the harms of politics. Moving from a democracy to an epistocracy, then, could be seen as
a way of managing this harm; that is to say, a way of reducing the sphere of politics and expanding the
scope of civil society. Thus, an argument against politics could be subsumed into an argument against
democracy.
Again, the claim here is not that Brennanmakes this argument. Merely that this line of argument,
or something close to it, is readily inferred from the way which Brennan presents his arguments in
Against Democracy. Of course, I have only offered a rough sketch of what such an argument might
look like. While I have not touched upon whatever sophistication or subtlety which lends this line
of inquiry more credence, this basic picture is enough to see how Brennan’s account against politics
is relevant to our evaluation between democracy and epistocracy. As such, I will spend some time
offering some considerations which I believe makes this line of argument less appealing.
3.2 Won’t You Be My Neighbor?
Brennan’s account begins with an assumption about politics. The ideal of politics, he claims, is to
establish a “sphere of cooperative friendship”88 What this entails is never defined with any precision.
87Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 22.
88Ibid., p. 231.
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It is characterized somewhat more descriptively in various ways throughout the chapter: as an ideal
of mutual respect and regard,89 as an ideal of civic friends all part of a great cooperative scheme,90
and as an ideal of fellow citizens engaged in a cooperative venture for mutual gain as friends.91 It is
from this premise that politics is meant to somehow secure this ideal that Brennan builds his account
against politics. After all, as he is quick to note, real world politics bears little resemblance to this
sphere of cooperative friendship.
Clarity on just what this ideal is would be helpful in analyzing Brennan’s account. Although he
notes that political philosophers sometimes describe politics this way, it is not clear why we should
accept this assumption in the first place.92 Certainly, what is described is idyllic and, everything else
being equal, preferable if possible. It would be nice if that was the way things were. But it is another
thing entirely to claim that such a state is an ideal of politics; which is to say that there is an intended
goal or the purpose of politics to realize this sphere of cooperative friendship.93 It would be lovely if,
on my way to the shops, I stumbled across a leprechaun’s pot of gold. The actual ideal of my shopping
expedition, however, is to buy whatever groceries I happen to need at reasonably low prices. It is
determined by my practical goals no matter how enticing the fantasy of treasure and proving the
existence of small Irish fairies might be.
It is surprising, then, that Brennan takes these to be real ideals of politics when what is described
are fairly lofty hopes. An ideal is sometimes described as a standard of perfection but usually any
ideal which is meant to taken seriously as a useful way of understanding a project is constrained by
feasibility. If an proposed ideal is unfeasible, then we should treat it as symptomatic of a different
89Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 231.
90Ibid., p. 245.
91Ibid., p. 235.
92The two citations he gives are Schwarzenbach, “On Civic Friendship” and Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friend-
ship.” It should be noted that both accounts are draw strongly upon Aristotle’s notion of philia which is not necessarily
taken to be the essential feature of politics in the mainstream.
93Notably, social contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls portray politics as a way of organizing individuals
with competing interests.
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problem. A failure to achieve an unfeasible ideal is not a failure of the project but a failure of the
conceptualizing the project from the start. It should be apparent, at this point, that I am skeptical that
politics is meant to arrive at some sphere of cooperative friendship. The stipulation of friendship is,
in my view, either so strong that it is obviously unfeasible or so weak that using the word ’friendship’
as a description is misleading. As such, I suggest that it will be best that we grant, for the sake of
argument, that the weakest of these characterizations is a feasible ideal of politics. That is to say, that
a minimally sufficient level of mutual regard and respect shared between citizens is a feasible ideal of
politics.94
With that being clarified, Brennan asserts that actual politics is rather different. His assertion
goes so far as to say that “Politics tends to makes us hate each other, even when it shouldn’t.”95 In
order to reinforce this claim, Brennan refers to a few empirical studies.
One of such studies which Brennan refers to is the research conducted by Shanto Iyengar and
Sean Westwood.96 In one study Brennan refers to, Iyengar and Westwood conducted an experiment
tomeasure how political bias might affect the evaluation of job candidates.97 This was done by having
a thousand subjects evaluate pairs of resumes. There were two basic resumes, one of which clearly
94Abrief aside; itmay also beworth noting that Brennan prima facie takes civil society and themarket economy to secure
something very similar if not identical to this sphere of cooperative friendship. As he claims with no justification, “In civil
society, most of my fellow citizens are my civic friends, part of a great cooperative scheme.” Brennan, Against Democracy,
p. 245 The only expansion on this subject which he offers is that “which I reflect on the role they play in civil society or
the market economy, I realize that I am made better off because of them. The typical person worldwide, in their role in
civil society or the market, has a small effect on my life, but that effect is positive.” ibid., p. 231 This seems to indicate that
there is either a very low bar for friendship or, as before, that we are entertaining more unfeasible daydreams. It is certainly
peculiar to describe civil society or market economy as if there is some grand cohesive scheme where everyone are friends
and cooperating. The Ku Klux Klan and the Black Lives Matter movement, for example, are presumably both parts of civil
society. The tribalistic and mutual disdain fans of rival sports teams have of each other on the mere grounds that the other
identifies as a fan of the rival team is also, presumably, part of civil society.
95Ibid.
96Shanto Iyengar and Sean J. Westwood, “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization,”
American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 3, 690–707, eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.
12152, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12152.
97Brennan also makes reference to another experiment discussed in Iyengar andWestwood’s paper. However, Brennan
only refers to this experiment as being conducted as a trust game. Iyengar andWestwood discuss two different experiments
which employed similar trust games to determine two different things: whether partisan biases would enter into conse-
quential decisions and an attempt to distinguish between the effects of in-group favoritism and out-group animosity. It
seems that he refers to the former rather than the latter, which is an interesting choice. At any rate, for our purposes, these
experiments show similar results to this one and so I will not spend more time on them for the sake of brevity.
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stronger than the other, which were randomly labeled as Republican or Democrat. The political af-
filiation of the subjects were also determined. Brennan highlights that they found that “candidate
qualification had no significant effect on winner selection.”98 This, he observes, is irresponsible and
corrupt behavior.99 Significantly, Brennan draws a causal relation out of just this; as he says “Politics
makes [emphasis added]us worse.”100.
Interestingly, Iyengar and Westwood makes some other observations which Brennan neglects to
present. First, that the first mentioned study was also done with racial cues and found that African
Americans also displayed an in-group bias comparable to that shown by Democrats and Republicans.
Given that Brennan happily draws a simple causal story out of the prior study, a similar causal story
might be drawn here. This, however, suggests that the blame is misplaced: it is not race that makes us
worse but howwe handle race. Similarly, it is not politics itself that makes us work but howwe handle
politics that makes us worse. The problemmight be better diagnosed as our behavior towards politics
and race. Secondly, that the subject Iyengar andWestwood are interested is partisanship rather than
simply politics wholesale. As they state, “Our underlying research questions are (1) how does partisan
affect compare with affect based on other social divides, and (2) to what extent are partisans willing to
discriminate against opposing partisans in nonpolitical decisions?”101 While partisanship is certainly
a significant part of understanding the nature of politics today, it is a gross simplification to suppose
that politics today can be reduced down only to partisanship. To put it another way, while observing
the effects of partisanship also reveals something telling about the nature of politics, it is a distinct
step further to then argue that this observation demonstrates that the nature of politics is causally re-
sponsible for those effects rather than partisanship andwhatever is inducing partisanship. At the very
least, Brennan is somewhat hasty.102 Finally, that throughout Iyengar and Westwood note that the
98Iyengar and Westwood, “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization,” p. 699.
99Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 233.
100Ibid.
101Iyengar and Westwood, “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization,” p. 692.
102Brennan also refers to Cass Sunstein’s opinion piece which comments on the research done in this area. (Sunstein,
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presence of social norms regarding race and discrimination generated a mitigating effect on behavior.
The absence of social norms regarding party membership and discrimination, however, allowed for
more extreme behaviors.103
Given these observations, Brennan asserts that politics has failed to achieve its ideal. While I have
argued that some characterizations of this ideal of a sphere of cooperative friendship are probably too
lofty for any illuminating discussion, a reasonably sufficient level of mutual regard and respect seems
to be a plausible goal of politics. The empirical research which Brennan cites does suggest that, at
least, modern American politics falls short of this ideal of mutual regard and respect in no small part
due to polarized partisanship. Whether or not these observations is enough to establish that we hate
each other, as he occasionally claims politics makes us do, is unclear to me. For Brennan, this is just
the start. His task is not merely to argue that politics has failed to achieve this ideal, but that it has
failed because of the nature of politics.
3.3 Civil Enemies
Brennan argues that politicsmakes us into enemies. Thewaybywhichhe arrives at this conclusion
does not rest upon any contingent or extrinsic factor like, for example, the content of politics or the
manner by which politics is communicated. Rather, the cause is argued to be intrinsic to the nature of
politics itself. AsBrennan emphasizes, “It’s notmerely that politicsmakes us see each other as genuine
enemies when it shouldn’t. Rather, politics tends to put us in genuinely adversarial relationships. It
“‘Partyism’ Now Trumps Racism”) Referring specifically to that of Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012), it is noted that that
in 1960, only 4–5% of Republicans and Democrats would be displeased if their children married members of the opposite
party compared to today where 49% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats admit that they would be displeased. Sunstein
takes this to indicate that explicit “partyism” is now more prevalent that before. Brennan leverages this to try to show
that politics is something to be avoided as much as possible. This is peculiar, in combination with Iyengar and Westwood’s
expressed conclusions, since this seems to indicate that the problem is not simply politics wholesale but the rise of polarized
partisanship within American politics. In fact, the change which Sunstein references demonstrates that politics does not
necessarily entail the sort of animosity and mistrust which Brennan bemoans.
103This suggests if social norms regarding party membership and discrimination were present, the problems raised by
Brennan would be mitigated. This is a possible avenue for dealing with the problem besides epistocracy.
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makes us genuine enemies with one another”104 It is not merely that politics fails to bring about a
sphere of cooperative friendship, then, but that it works against that ideal. This is, clearly, a strong
claim.105
However, Brennan is quick to clarify that he means a specific and non-standard sense when he
says “enemy”. He does not mean, as he puts it, “one common definition” where an enemy is just “a
person who hates me, who consciously wishes me ill and consciously works towards my harm.”106
While Brennan supposes that a minority of people qualify in this sense, it is clear that this common
definition is not one of the intendedmeanings when he claims that politics makes us enemies. Indeed,
this cannot be the case given that Brennan claims earlier in Against Democracy that most voters vote
for what they perceive to be the national interest.107 As such, he is committed to a conception of the
average voter who “genuinely want to help, and sincerely believe they’re voting in ways that make
things better, not worse, for their fellow citizens” and whose “motives seem pure and good.”108 This
picture of the average voter is obviously incompatible with the common definition of an enemy.109
104Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 235.
105It also contradicts Hume’s influential argument that competition due to scarcity is a pre-existing circumstance which
necessitates justice and, thus, politics. It is only in a state of abundance where there are no adversarial relationships.
106Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 235.
107Brennan bases this on the following body of work: Chong, “Degrees of Rationality in Politics”; Funk, “The Dual Influ-
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That being the case, when Brennan accuses politics of turning us into enemies, he does not mean this
common sense of the word.
Subsequently, the senses which Brennan is concerned with are clarified. He claims that there
are two senses by which politics makes fellow citizens into each other’s enemies. In the first sense,
politics makes us into what Brennan calls situational enemies. As he explains, “Politics is a zero-sum
gamewithwinners and losers. It creates adversarial relationships inwhichwe have grounds to oppose
one another and undermine each other’s interests.”110 Brennan does not give a name to the second
sense. This sense of “enemies” is that “sense in which most of my fellow citizens do want to hurt me,
even if they wouldn’t describe themselves as having that desire. They want to do things that will in
fact harm my children and me, even though they want to help.”111 Politics, then, makes us into each
others’ enemies in these two ways. This, then, is the philosophical substance of Brennan’s argument.
As such, I will examine each of these sense of “enemy” in turn.
3.4 Situational Enemies
Given that Brennan is committed to a belief that voters are generally good natured enough to not
intend harm by the exercise of what little political power they have, there must be a sense of “enemy”
which applies in the absence of the sort of will and emotions which are conventionally associated. To
this end, Brennan asserts that “There are scenarios in which we become each other’s enemies, even
though we have no intrinsic reason to dislike one another.”112 He refers to this sense of enemy as
situational enemies. The necessary features of such scenarios for creating situational enemies are
identified as involuntary, high-stakes, zero-sum games.113 That is to say, when people are forced to
passage, Brennan affirms that voters might dislike each other, it is not clear to me that mere dislike and this picture of good
will to all is sufficient to qualify as hate.
110Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 235.
111Ibid.
112Ibid., p. 236.
113Ibid., po. 236.
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compete such that a person can only gain when someone else loses then they become, as Brennan calls
them, situational enemies.
Politics is in Brennan’s view the sort of involuntary, high-stakes, zero-sum game which creates
situational enemies.114 He offers these three reasons as to why politics bears the relevant features:
“Political decisions involve a constrained set of options. In politics, there are usually only a
handful of viable choices.
Political decisions aremonopolistic: everyone has to accept the same decision.
Political decisions are imposed involuntarily through violence.”115
It should be noted, as above, that although he uses this as an argument against politics generally, he
specifically states, “the following features of the democratic political decision-making process tend to
makes us situational enemies.”116 However, as I will argue later, the features which Brennan identifies
here are present in any form of government except, maybe, non-syndicalist strains of anarchism.
First, it is unclear why Brennan claims that the claim that political decisions involve a constrained
set of options is relevant. For one thing, he does not provide any detailed elaboration of the claim. He
simply insists that, when compared to the set of options in market decisions, political decisions feel
like their set of options are constrained. Regardless of whether there is a dubious justification or
not, if we are interested in determining whether or not politics is the sort of context which generates
situational enemies and that determination rests on identifying politics as a kind of involuntary, high-
stakes, zero-sum game, thenwhether or not there is a constrained set of options seems to be irrelevant
to our inquiry. It instantiates none of the relevant features of politics which makes us situational
enemies.
Second, Brennan claims that political decisions are monopolistic. That is to say, when a political
decision is collectively made, every individual in that collective is committed to that decision regard-
114I suppose there is another interpretation which reads Brennan as simply arguing that politics tends to be a system of
conflict and, thus, generates situational enemies. On the other hand, however briefly, Brennan does specify some require-
ments of what makes situational enemies which, if taken seriously, are stronger standards than mere conflict.
115Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 237.
116Ibid.
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less of how theymight decide independently. I take this to be an obvious and self-evident observation.
Certainly, Brennan seems to think so as well since he elaborates upon this claim even less than the
prior. Interestingly, he describes this as if it is also obvious, that “For you to get your way is for you
to stop me from getting mine.”117 Which is to say, Brennan concludes with little explanation that be-
cause politics is monopolistic, it satisfies the zero-sum game requirement for generating situational
enemies.118 This raises some concerns. While some political decisions are such that there are winners
in losers in a way that resembles zero-sum games, there is no reason which requires that they are all
necessarily this way. Uncontroversial political decisions and political compromises where everyone
at least benefits as much as they lose are open possibilities. Whether or not the fact that politics some-
times resembles as zero-sum game is sufficient is unclear. For the sake of argument, let us suppose
that being monopolistic satisfies this requirement for situational enemies.
Third, Brennan claims that political decisions are imposed involuntarily through violence. That
is to say, “Governments do not merely advise us to follow their rules, hoping that we will comply out
of the goodness of our hearts. They enforce their laws and and rules with violence, or threats of vio-
lence.”119 I take it that this feature of politics is readily apparent. The law, when properly functioning,
applies to everyone and is enforced with some form of coercion or another. Significantly, Brennan
seems to treat this feature of politics as satisfying the last two requirements for making situational
enemies. First, the involuntary imposition of monopolistic political decision satisfies the involuntary
component of the kind of situationwhich Brennan believesmakes us enemies. I take this to be obvious
or, at least, readily apparent at how we might arrive at the latter from the former.
Secondly, the way by which political decisions are imposed through violence, or threat of violence,
seems to be seen byBrennan as satisfying the high-stakes component of the kind of situation necessary
for situational enemies. This use or threat of violence is treated as being both pervasive and profound.
117Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 240.
118Brennan does give some contrived examples in order to motivate this unjustified claim like what would happen if we
made our choice what music we listened to, what kind of pizza we should eat, or what kind of car we should buy subject to
a vote and made into policy.
119Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 240.
44
In Brennan’s view, “For someone to say, ‘There ought to be law regarding X’ is, in effect, to say, ‘I
want to threaten people with violence unless they do X.’”120 This, perhaps, may seem somewhat melo-
dramatic. However, it is argued that less dire forms of coercion, like fines, are in a sense reducible
to a state having its agents “physically assault, beat, and kill you, if necessary”121 As Brennan notes,
non-compliance with less offensive forms of coercion will bring about some other stronger form of
coercion. Continued non-compliance reiterates this and ultimately concludes with with or the threat
of institutionalized violence. The stakes for not playing the game, then, are fairly high.122
According to Brennan, these three features of politics are enough to make us situational enemies
with each other. That is to say, they aremeant to show that politics is an involuntary, high-stakes, zero-
sum game. For the sake of argument, I will suppose that this argument is sound although I have some
doubts.123 After all, our inquiry here is not whether or not politics makes us enemies but whether or
not this gives us grounds for an argument against democracy or epistocracy.
As discussed above, Brennan does not explicitly make the case that this argument against politics
leads to an argument against democracy. However, recall the way which Brennan identifies these
three features of politics which are involved in making us situational enemies: as being specifically
“features of the democratic [emphasis added] political decision-making process.”124 Even more sug-
gestive, when Brennan turns to address the second sense of enemy he begins, “There’s yet another
120Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 240.
121Ibid.
122We might, less generously, point out that this is not the same as a game with high-stakes. The stakes of politics as
Brennan describes depends upon the substance of each decision in question. The actual skates, then, ranges from low to
high and are indeterminate a priori. It is difficult to say, however, if this distinction is relevant given that Brennan spends
such little time exploring his notion of situational enemies.
123I suspect that Brennan is conflating “enemies”with a similar but distinct notion like “opponents”. As he argues, politics
creates conflict. But while conflict always creates opponents, it does not always make enemies. Friends can be in conflict,
after all. This is all to say, “enemies” is a rather strongword. Brennan’s viewmay be skewed by the fact that he is preoccupied
with elections. But much of politics takes place outside of elections where so-called enemies work together: they must
deliberate with, compromise with, and broker deals with one another. This requires some degree of mutual regard and
respect. Given that the state of being enemies is being used here as a evidence of a lack of mutual regard and respect, it
seems, then, that “enemies” is not appropriate here.
124Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 237.
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way democracy makes us enemies.”125 Regardless of whether Brennan intends to suggest so or not,
there is an argument against democracy which readily emerges from the account against politics as it
is presented.
If we accept that politicsmakes us situational enemies, then the nature of politics disrupts an ideal
of mutual regard and respect. If we believe in this ideal as something we are committed to achieving
through politics, then this is problematic.126 However, should we entertain this idea that there is
something unique to democracy which contributes to this problem, then it may seem that there is
reason to prefer something other than democracy. That is to say, if there was something special about
politics in democracy which makes us enemies, then politics in an epistocracy would better serve this
ideal of mutual regard and respect. At least, these are the basic premises which I suspect an argument
against democracy be built from the account against politics.
Of course, the structure of this argument ought to be familiar. This is the same approach as the
corruption and stultification arguments. If democracy is unique in generating some harm, then some-
thing else like epistocracy must be preferable. The response to this argument has the same tack as the
response to the stultification and corruption argument: democracy is not unique in the relevant ways
and, thus, there is no distinction between democracy and epistocracy in this regard. Epistocratic pol-
itics would also have a constrained set of options, make monopolistic political decisions, and impose
political decisions involuntarily through violence.
Epistocracy, after all, would offer the incompetent an empty set of options and the competent
the same sort of options available in democracy depending on the form of epistocracy. Any political
process which ends in a law reduces down to a constrained set of options consisting of yay or nay. Epis-
tocracy, after all, would make monopolistic political decisions. Any properly functioning government
which passes laws makes monopolistic decisions. Laws, after all, are not helpful suggestions but bind
individuals to that collective decision. There is no reason to expect that epistocracy would not make
laws. And finally, epistocracy, after all, would impose those political decisions involuntarily through
125Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 242.
126If not only for the possibility that, if Brennan’s account is true, it is a mistake to identify this ideal as a true end of
politics.
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violence. Any state which enforces law must, eventually, resort to coercion. There is no reason to
expect that epistocracy would have some alternative means of enforcement which is not available to
democracy. Epistocracy, then, would have the relevant features for creating situational enemies if
Brennan’s account is correct.
3.5 The Second Sense of Enemy
We can now turn to the second sense of how politics makes fellow citizens into enemies. Brennan
goes about describing this sense of the notion “enemies” somewhat obliquely. Under this sense, he
claims that most people do, in fact, desire or want to hurt their fellow citizens when they wield their
political power even though he remains committed to the belief that most people wield their political
power with altruistic intentions. This apparent desire to harm gives Brennan sufficient ground, in his
mind, to hate most people. That is to say, this gives him reason to see most other people as his enemy.
Interestingly, this need not be reciprocal: Brennan notes that the examples he gives of this second
sense of enemies “don’t consider themselves my enemies.”127 This second sense, then, looks to be a
peculiar understanding of the notion.
I take Brennan to be attempting to describe a common way people talk about political opponents
or other people with opposing political views. When someone desires a policy which we view as being
against our interest, we might say that that person wants to act against our interest; or, more crudely,
that they want to harm us because they support something which would harm us. This way of talking
about opponents resembles one of the features of the commonunderstanding of theword enemy. That
is to say, we talk about opponents as if they wish us ill or as if they were consciously working towards
our harm. Consequently, wemight call themenemieswhenwe are not being particularly rigorouswith
our language. As I will argue, however, this colloquial, unrigorous way of talking should not be taken
to be an actual, serious description of how we think about the inner psychology of our opponents. It is
just a casual way of talking about others’ actions from our own perspective. Alternatively, if we do take
127Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 244.
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this way of talking to be accurately descriptive of how people ascribe intentions to their opponents,
then it should be noted that they are mistaken.
Much of this confusion arises from Brennan’s instance on formulating this sense as a desire to
harm which is held concurrently with a desire to help. Or alternatively, he repeatedly explains this
by using language typically used when describing mental states like the will or intentions. His con-
cept is not only introduced in this formulation, as referenced above, but is repeated throughout his
explanation: “There’s an important sense, however, in which most politically active citizens do desire
to harm or impose unjustified risk of harm on their fellow citizens.”128 It should be noted that this
apparent contradiction of the wills, of a desire to help and a desire to harm, suggests a complex inner
life. Under this picture, it seems as if most people have some psychic turmoil over their intentions
when voting. That is to say, there ought to be some experience of cognitive dissonance if people desire
two ends that are obviously at odds with each other.
However, Brennan also describes a cognitive life, which he seems to take to be characteristic of the
phenomenon, which is absent the implications of his formulation described above. Here, he describes
a simpler picture in accordance with his previously discussed stance that most people desire to help
with no qualms or competing temptations. He reaffirms throughout that such people do, in fact, have
the genuine desire to help. Moreover, Brennan notes that such people “wouldn’t describe themselves
as having that desire [to harm].”129 Which is to say, any conscious desire or intent to harm when
voting is absent. And so, we are asked to believe that most people consciously desire to help when
voting without any duplicity or uncertainty while, at the same time, they desire to harm when they
vote without being aware of it. Of course, it might be possible that the latter desire is a subconscious
one. Brennan, however, makes no efforts towards this direction.130
128Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 243.
129Ibid., p. 235.
130It should be noted that in his footnotes, Brennan provides an alternative formulation: that most people have a de re
desire to harm others but a de dicto desire to help. I am not convinced this is a useful formulation, even if it is a correct
application of such a distinction. For one, it does not avoid the confused picture of the psychology of most people about
voting: by Brennan’s own stipulation, they only have one conscious desire. Even if acting upon that desire to help results
in harm, it is a mistake to then assert that this somehow demonstrates that there is a desire to harm present especially if it
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What Brennan is describing, then, is the fact that other people desire things which they perceive
as being in the common good which an individual perceives as being against their interest. Put this
way, this simply describes the fact that people disagree about what things are in the common good. It
is apparent that, from an objective outside perspective, this does not describe the sort of adversarial
relationship which would make the involved parties into genuine enemies. We might suppose, how-
ever, that in our less careful moments this describes the way we think from a first person perspective.
As a result, in our less careful moments, we might take this to be sufficient grounds for hate. This
second sense, then, might be more descriptive of the psychology of when we mistakenly take others
to be our enemy. This would explain why this is not a reciprocal relationship. The claim here, then,
is that politics does not make us into genuine enemies but causes us to mistake others as being our
enemy. This, perhaps, is not as strong a claim as Brennan would like but it does serve to disrupt an
ideal of mutual regard and respect.
It should be noted that Brennan’s treats this so-called desire to harm as reducible to something
else—something other than some will or intent. This “desire” serves, instead, as an oblique reference
to incompetence. Revealingly, at the start of the section regarding the second sense of enemy, Brennan
argues the following, “It turns out they have altruistic intentions when they wield this power. At the
same time, they wield that power in a highly incompetent way. This, I argue, gives me some reason
to hate them, to regard them as my enemies and I as theirs.”131 This formulation of the second sense
notably lacks any talk about a mysterious desire to harm. Rather, there is no desire to harm which
justifies hating or viewing someone as an enemy by Brennan’s argument. The grounds for the second
sense is the claim that most people are incompetent such that their political actions results in harms,
regardless of their desire to help. As Brennan says, “Their behavior gives me some reason to hate
them or wish them ill, although there is nothing but love in their hearts.”132 Significantly, however,
is stipulated that there was no such intention formed and present to begin with. For another, it is as unilluminating as the
formulation above. For another, it is no more illuminating that the formulation above given that either ultimately reduces
to the same claims about incompetence.
131Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 242.
132Ibid., p. 244.
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the result of their incompetent actions are not dependent upon any desires. If, as Brennan takes to be
the case, most people are so woefully mistaken about the consequences of their actions it is unclear
why their will or intentions are relevant: their political activity would create harm regardless. This
notion of a desire to harm is either reducible to a claim about incompetence or entirely superfluous.
Ultimately, the heavy lifting in Brennan’s story is done by most people’s incompetence rather than
their phantom desire to do harm. We have, instead, a rather straightforward claim without any talk
of desires. Because the incompetence of most people imposes a risk of harm, then there are grounds
to hate them and view them as enemies.
For the sake of argument, I will suppose that Brennan’s argument against politics here is valid. As
a brief aside, it’s worth noting that it is unclear whether or not this claim about the incompetence of
most people does justify either hating them or viewing them as an enemy. To put it another way, it is
unclear if we should hold politics as the responsible cause of someone’s mistaken moral or prudential
judgments. Earlier in Against Democracy, Brennan elaborates on just how much political power he
believes that each individual has in a democracy. This is meant to show that democracy does not, in
fact, empower us. He argues that the amount of political power wielded by an individual is infinites-
imally small. An individual’s power, in his account, only manifests when this vote breaks a tie and,
thus, determines the outcome.133 In all other cases, the choice signaled by a single vote, whatever it
is, does not affect the outcome. As such, the odds of a person’s vote mattering is very small indeed.
Given that Brennan holds this view, he claims that he is justified in hating individuals for the misuse
of their, as he characterizes it, “crumbs” of political power.134 This is to say, that someone is labeled as
an enemy over an outcome they had an infinitesimally small chance of determining. Whether this is
soundmoral judgment or not depends on an involved discussion ofmoral psychology which is outside
the scope of our current discussion. That being the case, I will leave that possible line of inquiry at
that.
It is puzzling why Brennan chooses to repeat the opaque formulation about contradictory desires
throughout when he has this cogent argument to hand. Possibly, it is to obfuscate the resemblance
133Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 31.
134Ibid., p. 110.
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this argument against politics has with Brennan’s competence argument against democracy which
we will examine in Chapter 4. Here, the risk of harm created by the incompetence of most people in
wielding their political power justifies hating them and viewing them as enemies. Later, the risk of
harm created by the incompetence of most people in wielding their political power justifies constrain-
ing what political power they have. The proximity of one to the other is clear. So much so, that in the
last paragraph of Against Democracy Brennan states,
In civil society, most of my fellow citizens are my civic friends, part of a great cooperative
scheme. One of the repugnant features of democracy is that it transforms these people
into threats to my well-being. My fellow citizens exercise power over me in risky and
incompetent ways. This makes them my civic enemies.135
As he describes it here, Brennan’s accounts against politics and against democracy dovetail into each
other in this regard.
Because the second sense is essentially a complaint about competence of the political body, I will
only make a few remarks here given that Chapter 4 will be dedicated to examining the competence
argument against democracy in detail. For now, it will be enough to note that Brennan essentially
claims that if the body of people who make political decisions are more competent, then there is less
reason to not only view that body as an enemy, but also for hating them. A greater degree of com-
petence would result in a lesser risk of harm. Since this is what drives the mechanism described in
Brennan’s second sense of enemy, there would be no reason, at least in this regard, which generates
civic enemies.
From this, a possible argument against democracy emerges from the account against politics.
Namely, that if there were some other form of government which resulted in a more competent politi-
cal body compared to democracy, then that would be superior, in this regard at least, to democracy in
achieving the ideal of mutual regard and respect. Hence, it may seem that an epistocracy would sat-
isfy this by culling the incompetent from the population which are permitted to participate in political
decision-making, thereby raising the average competence as it were.
135Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 245.
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Importantly, this argument depends upon how we evaluate the competence of a political body. I
will discussmore about whether or not an epistocracy ismore competent than a democracy in Chapter
4. For now, it is enough to observe that such an argument also applies to different forms of democ-
racy compared to each other. As Brennan admits, the more competent a democracy, the weaker this
objection to democracy: “…government agents inmodern democracies often act better than wemight
expect, as they get away with doing things the incompetent electorate would not support. In that case,
I haveweaker grounds for despisingmy fellow voters than I otherwisewould.”136 In otherwords, there
are ways by which democracy is more competent than Brennan’s evaluation of the competence of the
political body would have led us to believe. He treats this an artifact or aberration. As I will discuss
later, this instead suggests that there are mechanisms by which democracy may be more capable than
Brennan gives it credit, if it is not so already. If this later argument is right, then by his admission,
the strength of this argument against democracy is mitigated. In other words, there may be means
available to feasible and non-ideal forms of democracy which can manage Brennan’s worry about in-
competence generating civic enemies, thereby allowing or preserving a mutual regard and respect
between fellow citizens.
3.6 Epistocracy and the Ideal of Mutual Regard and Respect
Before that, I want to briefly explore a possible line of inquirywhich could lead us to the conclusion
that, even if epistocracy was more competent, there are reasons unique to epistocracy which remove
it from this ideal of mutual regard and respect. More specifically, if epistocracy takes political power
away from whomever it deems as incompetent, then it may systematically commit testimonial injus-
tices. The result of which would mean that some significant number of citizens would not be treated
with the kind of regard and respect due to them on a very basic level. This is prior to any knock-on
effect which may arise subsequent to this disenfranchisement. Given the scope of this paper, I will
only outline the rough structure of this argument since the details are somewhat involved.
136Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 244.
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In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker introduces the novel concept of a distinctively epistemic
kind of injustice. In exploring this notion, Fricker suggests two forms of epistemic injustice: testimo-
nial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Both are initially presented as distinct and different types
of injustices whichmay arise out of the common ground of prejudice to harm individuals in their epis-
temic capacities. Both forms of injustice were innovative and brought to light a relatively unexamined
but not unimportant region between epistemology and ethics. It is the first type of epistemic injustice,
testimonial injustice, which is relevant to our purposes.
This kind of epistemic injustice occurs during testimonial exchange. During a particular instance
of testimonial exchange there is a speaker and a hearer. When the speaker makes some assertion, the
hearer must make a judgment about the speaker’s credibility. Fricker argues that our conception of
social identity plays an important part of this process. As she explains, identity
is an integral part of the mechanism of testimonial exchange, because of the need for
hearers to use social stereotypes as heuristics in their spontaneous assessments of their
interlocutor’s credibility. This use of stereotypes may be entirely proper, or it may be
misleading, depending on the stereotype. Notably, if the stereotype embodies a prejudice
that works against the speaker, then two things follow: there is an epistemic dysfunction
in the exchange—the hearer makes an unduly deflated judgment of the speaker’s cred-
ibility, perhaps missing out on knowledge as a result; and the hearer does something
ethically bad—the speaker is wrongly undermined in her capacity as a knower.137
The wrong emerges as a result of prejudice. Prejudice, rather than properly used stereotypes, is es-
sentially a pre-judgment where a judgment is either made or maintained without proper regard to the
evidence. This feature of prejudice makes the hearer who misjudges the speaker as a result epistemi-
cally culpable.138
Moreover, the hearer is thereby culpable for wronging the speaker as a knower. As Fricker ob-
serves, “To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human
137Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 17.
138Ibid., p. 22.
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value. When one is undermined or otherwise wronged in a capacity essential to human value, one suf-
fers an intrinsic injustice.”139 That is to say, that in being undeservedly discounted as a knower and a
giver of knowledge, you are also valued less than what a fellow human deserves. Testimonial injustice,
then, is an epistemic insult to another intrinsic value as a human being. This seems to preclude any
ideal of a sufficient level of mutual regard and respect.
Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice is unfortunately limited to cases arising from prej-
udice. While we might suppose that it is plausible that some form of prejudice is likely to arise out
of the social divisions institutionalized by an epistocracy, the concept as it is fails to account for the
injustices first introduced by epistocracy. I suggest instead that the sort of testimonial injustice qua
prejudice which Fricker describes is just one sort of testimonial injustice. We might suppose that the
basic structure of testimonial injustice arises in other instances. Which is to say, a general form of
testimonial injustice may look something like the following: a testimonial injustice occurs whenever
someone’s testimony is wrongly discounted as a result of a pre-judgment whichmisrepresent that per-
son’s epistemic status and does not made in proper regard to evidence. A general form of testimonial
injustice might then occur under an epistocratic government.140
The problem arises from how competence is identified. Competence is not general; being compe-
tent in one aspect does not entail competence in another. Further, there is a vast variety of political
decisions which need to be considered in the course of governing. Presumably, every political decision
covers different subjects which brings different sorts of competences into relevance. In other words,
given the variety and breadth of the sort of political decisions which are considered, there must be a
variety and breadth of associated competences which can be made relevant to any particular decision
in question. Moreover, since part of competence is information, then we ought to include consider-
ations for different perspectives which might have privileged epistemic access to the relevant sort of
information.
139Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, p. 44.
140I suppose that it may be argued that the sort of approximations of competence which Brennan proposes be used in an
epistocracy might be so far removed from actual competent that they are a kind of stereotype. This might open the way to
argue that an epistocracy wrongly discounts people as knowers as a result of prejudice. I, however, find the idea of a general
notion of testimonial injustice eminently plausible and, hence, do not take that line of inquiry.
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This, then, presents a problem for epistocracy. Short of some absurdly complicated and unwieldy
process of determining which competences are relevant to each separate decision and which individ-
uals possess them, it is likely that whatever process is used to determine competence, and thus deter-
mine whose vote—or testimony—is counted or discounted, can only hope to reach an approximation.
As Brennan admits,
It’s probably impossible to design an exam that would precisely test the knowledge
needed for any particular election. After all, what’s at stake and thus what knowledge
is needed varies from election to election. Also, what counts as relevant knowledge is
reasonably disputed. That’s not to deny that there’s a truth of the matter about what
knowledge is relevant.141
Furthermore, the sort of tests for competence he suggests instead all attempt to approximate compe-
tence by tracking things which he admits are unlikely to ever be relevant to a vote.142 This is all just
to say that it is improbable that an epistocratic government would determine real competence in any
sound way. In other words, the credibility of the voter is pre-judged by this approximation without
any regard to the real evidence of one’s actual competence.
Taking all this into consideration, it would seem that an epistocratic government would curtail
a significant number of individuals’ ability to vote on the basis of this approximation of competence.
Since a vote is a kind of testimony, constraining the distribution of political power effectively discounts
the testimonies of those people the state determines to be incompetent. It may seem at face value that
this is a reasonable or relevant way of determining whose testimony is worthy of consideration. After
all, competence ought to track epistemic status. However, given that the state is likely to use meth-
ods which merely approximate competences—and probably in a very loose way—this determination
is thereby likely to not properly evaluate the epistemic status of each individual. Rather, these indi-
viduals’ testimony is discounted for reasons which do not track their relevant competences for the
141Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 212.
142This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4
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political decision in question. That is to say, their testimony is wrongly discounted. It seems, then,
that this is a case of testimonial injustice which arises from epistocracy’s defining feature. As such,
epistocracy disrupts an ideal of mutual regard and respect. Democracy, on the other hand, avoids
systematic testimonial injustice by simply granting universal suffrage.
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Chapter 4
DEMOCRACY AND COMPETENCE
4.1 The Antiauthority Tenet
Against Democracy introduces a novel approach for the evaluation between democracy and epis-
tocracy. Rather than appealing to the conventional intuition that the knowers or thewise ought to rule,
Brennan instead turns to the idea that the incompetent ought to not rule. It is along this approach
that the makes his strongest arguments both against democracy and for epistocracy by circumvent-
ing Estlund’s general argument against epistocracy. This is grounded upon a novel right which he
introduces as the competence principle.
Estlund’s general argument against epistocracy presumed that epistocrats depend upon three
tenets being true: the truth tenet, the knowledge tenet, and the authority tenet. While the truth and
knowledge tenets are granted—that is to say, that there are correct answers to political questions and
some citizens knowmore or aremore reliable at determining those truths—Estlund rejects the author-
ity tenet. He argues against the claim that when some citizens are more knowledgeable they ought to
be given political authority over others. Estlund made two objections, that of invidious comparison
and that of an expert/boss fallacy. For our present purposes, it is enough to observe that Brennan sim-
ply accepts these claims of Estlund’s general argument, especially the expert/boss fallacy.143 The case
for epistocracy, at least for Brennan, cannot come from the conventional intuition that the knowers
or the wise have a better claim to rule in virtue of their greater knowledge or wisdom.
Brennan instead argues that another avenue is open for epistocrats. Rather than the positive
argument of the conventional intuition, he puts forward a negative argument. Epistocracy, according
to Brennan, only needs to be an “antiauthority tenet”
Antiauthority tenet: When some citizens are morally unreasonable, ignorant, or incom-
143Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 17.
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petent about politics, this justifies not permitting them to exercise political authority over
others. It justifies either forbidding them from holding power or reducing the power they
have in order to protect innocent people from their incompetence.144
This tenet, then, can be held in the absence of the authority tenet. Contra Estlund, this case for epis-
tocracy is grounded on the truth, knowledge, and antiauthority tenets. It should be noted, however,
that this approach makes no positive defense of epistocracy, or any form of government, in of itself.
The case for epistocracy is instead made by rejecting all other alternatives. In other words, Brennan’s
argument for epistocracy depends entirely on his argument against democracy.
4.2 The Competence Principle
Brennan must persuade us that his antiauthority tenet is true. To do this he introduces the com-
petence principle:
The competence principle: It is presumed to be unjust and to violate a citizen’s rights to
forcibly deprive themof life, liberty, or property, or significantly harm their life prospects,
as a result of decisions made by an incompetent deliberative body, or as a result of deci-
sions made in an incompetent way or in bad faith.145
Brennan attempts to convince that this principle is plausible mainly through the use of intuition
pumps and an analogy to the supposed right to a competent jury. Regardless of whether or not a gen-
eralized competence principle really can be derived from the right to a competent jury, let us grant for
the sake of argument that the competence principle is true.146
144Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 17.
145Ibid., p. 141.
146 It is, on the face of it, plausible. Whether or not Brennan’s arguments would be sufficient for establishing a right
which comes prior to any state would require a discussion of just what grounds can instantiate what kinds of rights. This is
outside the scope of this paper.
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It will be worthwhile to examine certain features of the competence principle in greater detail.
First, that it is what Brennan calls a “presumptive right”.147 This presumptive right to competent gov-
ernment is later given the formulation “that competence and good faith are at least presumptive con-
ditions of the right to rule.”148 Brennan elaborates on the concept of presumptive conditions as being
similar to but weaker than necessary conditions. Unlike necessary conditions, where the absence of
the condition precludes the result, presumptive conditions merely indicate that, by their absence, the
result also does not occur unless the mechanism behind the presumptive conditions is defeated or
outweighed by countervailing conditions.149 Stipulated as such, we can observe that the competence
principle, as a presumptive right, is not a “necessary right”. We also should note that the competence
principle is defeasible: it can be defeated or outweighed by countervailing conditions.
Second, the competence principle is grounded upon the high stakes which may be associated
with some political decisions. The injustice emerges when there is a significant harm to citizens’ life
prospects or a forcible deprivation of life, liberty, or property. As such, “The competence principle
applies only to high-stakes decisions—decisions that can tend to cause significant harm to people, or
deprive them of life, liberty, or property. It doesn’t apply to low-stakes decisions, such as what the
national anthem or flag colors will be.”150 It is difficult to see how the competence principle could be
otherwise. As Brennan says, “One justification for the competence principle is that it is unjust to ex-
pose people to undue risk.”151 This is whatmotivates the antiauthority tenet and lends the competence
principle plausibility. The sort of risks he is primarily concerned with includes the fact that govern-
ments make “morally momentous decisions” as they determine the way the principles of justice are
applied and the shape of our basic institutions.152 This and the possibility that government decisions
147Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 143.
148Ibid., p. 149.
149Ibid., p. 151.
150Ibid., p, 201.
151Ibid., p. 154.
152Ibid., p, 156.
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“can significantly harm citizens’ life prospects, and deprive them of life, liberty, and property” are the
“crucial features” of government decisions which he is concerned with.153 These crucial features, then,
are the kind of high-stakes which makes the application of the competence principle appropriate.
Third, Brennan makes an important clarification on how the competence principle is applied. He
establishes the scope under which we assess possible violations of this presumptive right. As he em-
phasizes, “It’s crucial to remember that the competence principle applies to individual political deci-
sions.”154 Presumably, the competence principle would be unworkable otherwise by having to chase
the causal chain in either direction. Violations of the competence principles, then, only reflect upon
the specific instance of political decision-making rather than the process as a whole. As I will discus
later, this clarification of the competence principle has significant ramifications for our evaluation
between democracy and epistocracy.
For now, it is enough to note that this clarification not only entails that each political decision
is evaluated individually but also that the evaluation of an individual political decisions assesses the
competence of the specific decision-making body which formed that decisions. The competence of
one decision-making body should not factor into the assessment of a political decision formed by a
different, distinct decision-making body. Brennan uses this clarification of the competence princi-
ple to distinguish between electoral and post-electoral decisions where the distinct decision-making
bodes are the electorate and the relevant government officials, respectively.155 Since these political
decisions are evaluated individually, this is not a kind of contamination theory which holds that “if a
prior or upstreamdecision violates the competence principle, all subsequent or downstreamdecisions
are invalidated.”156,157 These distinctions allow Brennan to offer a token explanation of why democ-
153Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 156.
154Ibid., p. 159.
155Ibid., p. 156.
156Ibid., p. 166.
157 While Brennan makes no comment on the opposite direction, it is unclear how subsequent decisions could invalidate
prior decisions given these commitments.
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racy does better than it would appear to according to his account: while post-electoral decisions may
mostly comply with the competence principle, electoral decisions likely do not.158
Finally, Brennan makes the important clarification that the competence principle is a “disquali-
fier”. By this he makes clear that the competence principle only articulates “grounds against either
distributing power in certain ways or allowing the scope of power in certain ways.”159 The compe-
tence principle is not a “qualifier”—which gives ground on behalf of some way of distributing political
power—or both adisqualifier and aqualifier. In otherwords, the competence principle, or competence
violations, only give a reason to view something as illegitimate. As Brennan makes explicit, compli-
ancewith the competence principle “does not justify imbuing anyonewith power.”160 The competence
principle is, after all, only a presumptive right and so is coexistent and defeasible by other disqualify-
ing and qualifying principles. It gives us a presumptive reason for viewing some distribution of power
as wrong.
As such, the terms of our present inquiry are made clear. Given the restricted scope of how we
apply the competence principle, violations only give us reason to disqualify that particular instance of
the decision-making process. More to the point, a competence principle violation does not automati-
cally entail that the decision-making process itself is disqualified. Granted, if some system results in
sufficiently frequent violations, then we have grounds to recognize it as being sufficiently unreliable
and, hence, faulty. However, we are not presently concerned with evaluating if democracy is unreli-
able in this regard. (Indeed, Brennan admits that democracy does better than we might expect, as
mentioned earlier.) Rather, we are interested in evaluating how democracy compares to epistocracy.
Evaluating which is preferable in this regard means determining which one is likely to result in the
least frequent competence principle violations.
158Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 161.
159Ibid., p. 166.
160Ibid., p. 168.
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4.3 What Is Competence?
We might, at this point, wonder just what is entailed when we say “competence”. Unfortunately,
Brennan shies away from providing a precise definition of competence. This question is not merely
academic. If we take the competence principle seriously, then we should want to be able to apply it
in an objective and consistent way in order to recognize injustice, illegitimate political decisions, and
what sorts of responses to the prior would be appropriate. To this end, it some precise definition of
competence, like what the necessary or sufficient conditions for competence are, is required. Instead,
Brennan argues, “As far as I can tell, for my argument to go through, I need rely only on relatively un-
controversial platitudes about competence. It’s not clear I need to defend a precise theory of political
competence.”161 As such, no precise definition of competence is ever committed to. While Brennan
briefly peruses a number of possible candidates for what a more substantive definition of competence
might look like, the point remains that he never endorses any one in particular.
This is rather revealing of how Brennan perceives the question of whether democracy or epistoc-
racy is superior in regards to the competence principle. A precise definition is apparently unnecessary
since the degree to which democracy fails the competence principle more than epistocracy dissolves
any problems of vagueness. It seems to be a black and white matter for him. Democracymust be obvi-
ously incompetent—regardless of whatever we understand to constitute competence. To continue the
metaphor, it is evident that Brennan does not even entertain the possibility that it may be a difficult
comparison between the two: it will not be like trying to figure out if this particular shade of off-white
paint matches the specific eggshell on the walls of a rented flat.
While Brennan does not commit to any precise theory of competence, he does make some claims
about competence which will be significant later. For one, it is fairly evident that Brennan conceives
of competence primarily in epistemic terms like knowledge or reasoning. Though it should come as
no surprise given that conventional epistocratic theories are explicitly concerned with knowledge and
wisdom. Competence, then, carries on in the same vein.
161Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 162.
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Even though Brennan demurs from giving a precise standard of what sort of knowledge, and how
much of it, is necessary for competence, he does give us some picture of what might be involved. For
instance, he claims,
To know whom to vote for, one needs to know more than what candidates stand for,
what the candidates have done in the past, or what they intend to do in the future. A
well informed voter needs to be able to assess whether the candidates’ preferred policies
would tend to promote or impede the voter’s favored outcomes.162
To this end, Brennan gives examples of what this should look like. Say we are interested in reducing
inner-city crime; “Again, to know who to vote for, I’d need to know about criminology, the economics
and sociology of black markets, and the history of the Prohibition.”163 Or given we are interested in a
variety of pursuits, Brennan gives a more generalized picture of what things a voter must know. He
argues that, in order to assess the performance of politicians “requires a tremendous amount of so-
cial scientific knowledge.”164 He later asserts that “a strong grasp of history, sociology, economics,
and moral philosophy [are] all subjects needed to understand which policies secure social justice and
promote the common good.”165 Evidently, the degree of knowledge which would make someone com-
petent is quite substantial.166 It should be noted that Brennan does not make the Millian inference
that education corresponds, and thus serves as an estimate, of practical wisdom.
162Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 28.
163Ibid.
164Ibid., p. 29.
165Ibid., p. 144.
166 The preoccupation with knowledgemay appear odd given that Brennan notes that the least knowledgeable tend not to
vote in the first place and that most people who do have some degree of knowledge tend to what he describes as “hooligans”.
These political hooligans have more knowledge than average but arrive at that knowledge improperly, displaying biases,
irrationality, and political tribalism. Only a minority of voters are “vulcans” who are very knowledgeable and sufficiently
free of bias. Given the temptation to view political hooligans as being worse or more harmful than the least knowledgeable
who do not bother to vote, wemightwonderwhy concern is placed on knowledge first and foremost rather than, say, political
polarization or other effects which might contribute to political hooliganism.
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However, without a precise definition we are left with the question of how we ought to assess an
individual’s competence. Interestingly, Brennan suggests that we could simply approximate it. He
admits that there are a number of problems with testing for competence: that it would be susceptible
to the influence of “real people with their own agendas and ideologies”, that what counts as relevant
knowledge can be reasonably disputed, and that “it’s probably impossible to design an exam that
would precisely test the knowledge needed for any particular election.”167 Despite the fact that there
are a number of barriers to directly tracking competence, Brennan insists that a scheme of restricted
suffrage or plural voting on the basis of some assessment of competence is still feasible. Directly
assessing competence, however, is evidently not feasible. Instead, these proposed schemes resort to
indirect approximations of individual’s actual competence by assessing other indicators.
The kind of suggested indicators of competence are weakly correlated with actual competence—at
best. This is admitted by Brennan. He suggests a voter qualification exam which would be limited to
basic facts and fundamental, largely uncontested social claims. He gives a number of examples ofwhat
this might look like: in the United States, such a test might use questions from the ANES, the citizen-
ship exam, the Advance Placement exams in economics and political science, logic and mathematics
puzzles, or even simply asking that potential voters “identify 60 percent of the world’s countries on a
map.”168 Brennan admits that “Much of this knowledge is strictly speaking irrelevant to any given elec-
tion.”169More explicitly, he states that “most of the information on tests like these isn’t useful for being
a competent voter”.170 He claims that such tests can be feasibly used in an epistocracy because such
exams “would not directly test knowledge but things that might be positively correlated with political
knowledge.”171 Moreover, Brennan does not elaborate on how strong a positive correlation between
an indicator and competence would be sufficient and whether these tests meet that requirement. It
167Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 212.
168Ibid.
169Ibid.
170Ibid., p. 148.
171Ibid., p. 212.
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appears that it can be exceptionally weak given that Brennan also states, “it might be that if we made
voting rights conditional on passing such exams, this correlation would diminish or disappear.”172
The added incentive and low difficulty would allow people to simply “cram for the exam” such that
“the exam would stop being a proxy for background social scientific knowledge.”173 He concludes that
voter qualification exams may need to be more difficult than the examples he proposed. However,
without a precise definition of competence and with the various other barriers impeding directly mea-
suring competence, these kinds of tests would always be indirect approximations of an individual’s
actual competence. For all the emphasis that such high risk decisions must be made competently,
such approximations are apparently good enough for government work.
Lastly, Brennan gives an intriguing reason why we might be satisfied with the assertion that a
precise definition of competence is unnecessary. It may be the case that we broadly agree upon one al-
ready. He claims that “The average citizen could produce a reasonable concrete theory of competence.
Most citizens have a good and reasonable intuition about political competence.”174 In other words, we
all have reasonably similar notions of what competence might look like. It would seem, then, that we
could at the very least agree upon some “pretty good, reasonable answer—that is, an answer within the
range of acceptable views” if asked to.175 Hence, a precise and substantive definition is unnecessary if
we can already expect to agree upon a sufficiently good enough one.
As Brennan admits, this looks like a strange move to make. In fact, he calls this “an insidious
result”: “Democracies might themselves be competent to adjudicate the nature of political compe-
tence.”176 In Brennan’s mind, if democracy is capable of determining what counts as competence,
then it presents itself as a possible way of determining “who is allowed to vote”—or, who is compe-
172Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 212.
173Ibid.
174Ibid., p. 224.
175Ibid., p. 225.
176Ibid., p. 224.
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tent.177 In other words, democracy could determine what an epistocracy would look like. At least, this
is the consequence Brennan takes to derive from the claim that most people have a reasonably good
idea of what competence is.
4.4 How Competent Is Democracy?
With a better grasp of how Brennan conceives the competence principle, we can now turn our
attention to how the argument from this competence principle should factor in our inquiry. For the
sake of argument, let us accept Brennan’s competence principle as he presents it. Moreover, let us
grant that the competence principle is sufficient for the antiauthority tenet which, in turn, is sufficient
grounds for justifying an epistocracy. Our inquiry, the one which Brennan sets out for us to consider,
is not whether epistocracy can be justified but whether democracy or epistocracy outperforms the
other in the relevant instrumental ways which Brennan picks out. In this regard, the application of
the competence principlemeans wemust evaluate whether it is democracy or epistocracy that is likely
to violate the competence principle the least.
We can begin with the first part of the inquiry: how often does democracy violate the competence
principle? According to Brennan, the “straightforward conclusion” is quite bleak. Given the premise
that voters are ignorant, irrational, and misinformed, it would seem that this ought to result in quite
a number of competence principle violations. After all, if the majority of people in a democracy is
incompetent, then it seems to follow that the political decisions made by that democracy are most
likely formed by incompetent people. As Brennan argues, “They support bad policies (or politicians
who support bad policies), which they would not support if they were better informed and processed
that information in a rational way.”178 The straightforward conclusion, then, argues that the answer is
quite simple. Given the vast and entrenched ignorance and irrationality the great majority of people
display when it comes to politics, it must be the case that the case that democracy systematically
violates the competence principle as a result of the sheer number of incompetent voters.
177Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 224.
178Ibid., p. 172.
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However, Brennan admits that this straightforward conclusion is probably mistaken. He allows
that “It’s at least theoretically possible that the democratic electorate is competent as a collectivewhole
even if the overwhelming majority of the individuals within the body are incompetent at politics.”179
Further, he admits that “democracies do better thanwemight expect given howmisinformed and irra-
tional voters are.”180 Despite these concessions, however, Brennan remains committed to a qualified
version of the straightforward conclusion.
He attempts to account for discrepancy between his expectations and the observed performance of
most democracies by distinguishing between electoral and post-electoral results. Democracies appear
to do well because they tend to make good decisions after the election. Brennan is firm, however, that
even this concession will leave his main argument for epistocracy intact:
After all, it looks like the electorate systematically violates the competence principle dur-
ing the election, even if elected leaders, bureaucrats, and others are less likely to violate
the competence principle after the election.181
This claim about the systematic violation of electoral decisions is never elaborated further. Rather,
it appears that this claim is explained by a qualified version of the straightforward conclusion. If
the majority of voters in an election are ignorant and irrational, it must be the case that elections, at
the very least, violate the competence principle as a result of the sheer number of incompetent voters.
Further, aswill be discussed inmore detail below, Brennan claims that the the systematic violations by
electoral decisionswill have knock-on effects for post-electoral decisions. As such, Brennanmaintains
that democracies systematically violate the competence principle despite their better than expected
performance. This certainly sounds like there is quite a lot of competence violations.
Even this qualified straight forward conclusion, however, is problematic. Even if we accept Bren-
nan’s premises and apply the competence principle as he describes to democracy, it is evident that
179Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 172.
180Ibid., p. 174.
181Ibid.
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it is not the case that all forms of democracies will necessarily systematically violate the competence
principle as is described. Democracy, even nonideal democracy, can institutionalize various mech-
anisms which allow it to mitigate and manage the incidence of competence principle violations. A
simple analysis of how the competence principle would apply to democracy with full consideration of
such institutionalmechanisms reveals that democracy is capable of preventing systematic competence
principle violations. As such, it is reasonable to expect democracy to perform considerably better in
this regard than what Brennan gives it credit for.
Brennan anticipates this line of argument but fails to fully appreciate it. While he recognizes that
a number of features of democratic institutionsmediate and intervene between voters and political de-
cisions, he treats these as aberrations or anomalies. He interprets this as evidence that “It means that
democracy works better than it otherwise would because it doesn’t exactly work.”182 He reasons that
because “What democracies do is not simply a function of voter preferences” it must not be working
properly.183 It is not entirely clear why such things should be seen as dysfunction without an under-
standing of what proper functioning is meant to look like. Unfortunately, Brennan does not explicitly
establish what he believes properly functioning democracy ismean to look like. Given that is this char-
acterized as democracy not working properly, we can get some idea of how Brennan conceives democ-
racy is meant to function. Further still, he makes some offhanded claims about democracy which are
revealing like “Democracy empowers each person with an equal basic share of political power”184 and
“Democracy is supposed to give every individual citizen equal voice”185. It appears that Brennan be-
lieves that democracy is meant to be mostly a function of voter preferences where every individual
has equal share of power and equal voice. This, or something like this, is the ideal and every apparent
aberration or compromise to that ideal is evidence of a dysfunctioning democracy.
182Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 198.
183Ibid., p. 200.
184Ibid., p. 52.
185Ibid., p. 198.
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This is a rather simplistic conception of democracy. It is mostly descriptive of direct democracy.
However, the sort of democracies which are actually practiced, and the kind which I will be evaluating,
are rather more complex—that is to say, sophisticated. It would be naive to assert that all democratic
forms are essentially and whole-heartedly committed to giving voters an equal voice and equal share
of power or are simply functions of voter preferences. The head of government, for example, patently
has more power and voice over political decision-making than the average voter by virtue of their
position. Despite this, we have no qualms when identifying states with presidents or prime ministers
as democracies.186 Most forms of democracy, which we are happy to call democracy, are committed
tomuchweaker ideals like equally weighted votes and equal access to legislative processes rather than
equal share of power and equal voice.
In other words, democracy is not constrained to the extreme egalitarianismwhich Brennan seems
to have in mind. While democratic commitments clearly prohibit some political inequalities, some
forms of democracy which are uncontroversially accepted as democracies allow and even institution-
alize other sorts of political inequalities. Most significantly, representative democracies, or indirect
democracies, are founded on an institutionalized inequality where the power of a set of voters is in-
vested in a representative. As such, representatives enjoy greater political power and voice as a result
of this delegation. Representative democracy, by its very nature, cannot be committed to equal share
of power and equal voice. It is significant that the prototypical conception of modern democracies is
representative democracy. The institutionalization of political representation is one such mechanism
which helps prevent competence principle violations. Given this, it is not clear that the intervention
andmediation of variousmechanisms between the voter and political decisions necessarily represents
a dysfunction of democracy. As the saying goes, “It’s not a bug, it’s a feature.”
We are compelled, then, to evaluate the application of the competence principle to democracy
with full consideration to these possible institutionalized mechanisms which are compatible with and
can be incorporated into democracy. It might be the case that some forms of democracy, like direct
democracy, are susceptible to Brennan’s objection. However, I do not take our inquiry to be evaluating
186When they are democracies. Simply having an executive called a president or primeminister is obviously not sufficient
for a democracy.
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how the worst forms of democracy compare to attractive, hypothetical forms of epistocracy. There is
a wide variety of forms which democracy, or epistocracy, might take and there is a range of expected
performance associatedwith those various forms. Moreover, I do not take our inquiry to be evaluating
how the present forms of democracy compare to attractive, hypothetical forms of epistocracy. There’s
no particular reason to suppose that anyone is committed to the thesis that present democracy is
the best possible realization of democracy. It ought to be also understood that this inquiry is not an
evaluation of ideal forms of democracy. The kind of institutional mechanisms which I will examine
are perfectly feasible for a non-ideal democracy. I suspect that most of the mechanisms which will be
examined can be plausibly found to some degree in actual, present democracies. Our inquiry sets out
to examine how themost promising nonideal forms of democracy compare against themost promising
nonideal forms of epistocracy. To this end, we must therefore consider how the competence principle
applies to the most promising nonideal forms of democracy. Brennan’s straightforward conclusion
will not suffice.
4.5 Post-Electoral Competence
First, it will be useful to examine how the application of the competence principle to post-electoral
decisions should result in an expectation that post-electoral decisions are likely competent. It should
be noted thatwhile Brennan admits that post-electoral decisionsmight tend to be competent, he never
explicitly admits that they are. He also admits that democracy tends to perform better than expected
and only offers this as a possible for explanation. We could infer that there is a tacit admission that
post-electoral decisions do tend to be competent. In light of this, the point of this examination is
not to reiterate this. Rather, I hope to demonstrate how the application of the competence principle
to representative democracies shows that we ought to expect democracies to perform successfully,
especially in this regard. Further, the following analysiswill be a useful example of how the application
of the competence principle with full considerations of possible sophisticated institutions shows that
democracy is capable of managing the risk of violating the competence principle. For the sake of
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brevity, I will focus on the mechanisms of political representation but take it that if this holds then
there are likely other mechanisms which perform similarly.
In this case, one of Brennan’s clarifications plays a significant role in explaining why we ought
to expect democracy to do quite well with post-election decisions. Recall that he stipulates that the
competence principle is only applied to individual political decisions. By limiting the scope of how
the competence principle operates to individual decisions, it follows that, when assessing a political
decision for possible violations, we examine the particular decision-making body which formed that
political decision. Moreover, there is no contamination theory where other, prior political decisions
which violate the competence principle entails that later, downstream decisions must also be viola-
tions as a result of the prior.
These features of the competence principle mean that when we assess post-electoral decisions
we assess the competence of the post-electoral decision-making body responsible for the decision in
question. As such, even if we believe that the electorate are profoundly incompetent, post-electoral
decisions tend to comply with the competence principle. When we assess post-electoral decisions,
we must assess a set of decision makers distinct from the general public since, in a representative
democracy, the electorate do not make post-electoral decisions.187 Indeed, it is a distinctive feature
of representative democracy that the electorate elect representatives who, in turn, make political de-
cisions on behalf of the electorate. The competence of a post-electoral decision, then, depends upon
the competence of the relevant representatives and appointees responsible.
In which case, we should expect post-electoral decisions to be competent most of the time. After
all, the sort of individuals which make post-electoral decisions—elective representatives, appointed
bureaucrats, and judiciaries—tend to be competent. A generous interpretation of Brennan’s account
might infer that something like the above is implied by his comments. However, what is significant
187Brennan’s terminology of electoral and post-electoral is noticeably unwieldy here. It distinguishes political decisions
between election decisions and all other political decisions which aremade after an election. I will continue to use Brennan’s
terminology for the sake of convenience and to avoid any verbal disagreement, but recognizing a more descriptive catego-
rization reveals an interesting point. I take it that there are three major categories of political decisions in a representative
democracy: electoral decisions which are made by the electorate, government decisions which are made by government
bodies, and referendums which are made by the electorate. Notably, it is unclear where referendums fit in Brennan’s cat-
egorization. As it will become clear, I will treat post-electoral decisions as government decisions. As such, referendums
should be treated as distinct from post-electoral decisions. I will address the implications the competence principle bears
on referendums in the next section.
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is that the consideration of political representation when assessing compliance with the competence
principle reveals that this result is not by accident or dysfunction of democracy. Rather, the tendency
for government officials to be competent is a function of political representation.188
Brennan claims to make an argument to the contrary: that we ought to expect representatives to
be worse as a result of the incompetence of the general electorate.189 The argument is founded on two
premises. The first is that the degree to which voters are ignorant, incompetent, andmisinformed sys-
tematically changes their policy preference.190 The second premise holds that political parties choose
candidates on the basis of their appeal to voters. As such, Brennan reasons that the policy platforms
upon which candidates run are influenced by the level of competence of the typical voter. From this,
he states, “In short, it’s true that the party systemmakes it easier for low-information voters to choose
among the candidates presented to them, but at the same time, because voters are badly informed, the
quality of the candidates is much lower than it otherwise would be.”191 There seems to be an inferred
logical step that the policy preferences which arise out of a greater degree of incompetence not merely
different but worse. Elsewhere, Brennan clarifies that it is not a logical necessity that the incompetent
are wrong and the competent are right, but that it is a probabilistic or abductive claim.192 Supposing
that his account of how the electorate influences the policy platforms of the candidates is true, he takes
it that “if voters tend to be ignorant, irrational, ormorally unreasonable, this not only tends to result in
bad choices at the polls but also to make it so that the candidates on the ballot are of bad quality. The
quality of the candidate pool itself depends significantly on the quality of the electorate.”193 It seems,
188If political representation picks out representatives who aremore competent than the electorate, meritocratic appoint-
ments act as a similarmechanism between representatives and the bureaucracy and help ensure that appointed bureaucrats
are even more competent than political representatives.
189I say claim because he states that he details this argument in Chapter 2 of Against Democracy. I cannot, however,
find it—perhaps through some fault of my own. As such, I will do my best to reconstruct Brennan’s argument from the
references to this argument.
190This will be examined in more detail later in the chapter. For now, let us suppose this is true.
191Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 196.
192Ibid., p. 190.
193Ibid., p. 159.
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then, that Brennan perceives the strength of the influence which the voters exert on the competence
of the candidates to be quite strong. He believes that candidates are of bad quality as a result.
However, this account is not enough to refute the argument that government officials tend to be
competent as a function of political representation such that post-election decisions tend to comply
with the competence principle. While it appears to contradictory, we could grant Brennan’s account—
more or less—and still hold that representative democracy tends to pick competent representatives,
bureaucrats, and judiciaries. Brennan’s account is insufficient for his conclusion for two reasons. First
is a result of another feature of the competence principle which Brennan clarified. Since the compe-
tence principle is only a disqualifier, violations only arise when the decision-making body is suffi-
ciently incompetent. It makes no claims about who ought to rule; only who ought not to rule. As such,
elected representatives need not be maximally competent in order to avoid violating the competence
principle. Suppose an elected representative was the least competent among the candidates they ran
against. So long as the representative was sufficiently competent, then they would not be likely to con-
tribute to competence principle violations. In which case, even if the quality of candidates is worse
as a result of the policy preferences of an incompetent electorate and even if the quality of candidates
would be better otherwise, the minimal requirement for voters is that they elect candidates who are
sufficiently competent. Even if voters make the “wrong” electoral decision by not choosing the maxi-
mally competent candidate, they do not necessarily elect a representative who is incompetent. Thus,
the claim that political representation tends to select competent government officials and the claim
that an incompetent electorate worsens the quality of political candidates are compatible so long as
elected representatives tend to be meet some minimum requirement for competence.
Secondly, it is clear that elected representatives do tend tomeet thisminimal requirement for com-
petence. Unless we take an overly restrictive view of competence, then representatives already tend
to meet likely standards of competence—or, at least, meet the kind of approximations which Brennan
suggests correlate with competence. Taking the United States Congress as an example, “As has been
true in recent Congresses, the vast majority of Members(94.1% and 100% of Senators) at the begin-
ning of the 115th hold bachelor’s degrees. Sixty percent of House Members and 76% of Senators hold
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educational degrees beyond a bachelor’s.”194 Of the 537Members of Congress, only 18Members have
no educational degree beyond a high school. What is more, while the 115th Congress has continued
an increasing trend, elected representatives of Congress have historically tended to be educated:
By comparison, approximately 35 years ago in the 97th Congress (1981-1982), 84% of
House members and 88% of Senators held bachelor’s degrees. Approximately 45 years
ago, in the 92nd Congress (1971-1972), 77% of House Members and 97% of Senators held
bachelor’s degrees. Sixty years ago in the 85%Congress (1957-1958), 68%ofHouseMem-
bers and 77% of Senators held bachelor’s degrees.195,196
All in all, elected representatives tend to be university educated. Moreover, most have graduate de-
grees.
Without a precise definition of competence, it is perhaps unclear how to interpret these statistics
in terms of competence. However, relative to the sort of approximations which Brennan suggests, a
university education is likely as good an approximation of competence as any. It would be odd to argue
otherwise. At the beginning of Against Democracy Brennan introduces the premise that most people
are ignorant by intimating, “Yet since you’re reading this book, I can assume that you have or soonwill
have at least a bachelor’s degree. Even if you attended a lower-tier university, your classmates were
still the intellectual elite of your country. You, your friends, your relatives, and your acquaintances
are probably at least among the top 10 percent most informed people in your country.”197 What is
more, in most epistocratic plural voting schemes like the ones suggested by Mill or Brennan, addi-
tional votes are awarded with additional university degrees. If this plural voting scheme is meant to
194Jennifer E. Manning,Membership of the 115th Congress: A Profile, technical report R44762 (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, 2017), p. 5.
195Ibid.
196It is interesting to observe that as mentioned in the last chapter, Brennan takes the research of Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes (2012) to indicate that politics has made us worse over time; or, as Sunstein said, more vulnerable to “partyism”.
If it is true that voters have become worse since the 1960s and that the quality of the candidates on the ballot depends
significantly on the the quality of the voters, wemight expect a downward trend of education levels in Congress. Thankfully,
that does not seem to be the case.
197Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 24.
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track competence, then a university education must be considered a reliable way of approximating
competence. In which case, if elected representatives tend to have a university education, we should
take this to indicate that elected representatives tend to to be competent.
As such, it is even the case now that the electorate, as incompetent as they are, tend to pick suffi-
ciently competent representatives. Wemight regret the fact that this does not entail that the electorate
does not choose those candidates which aremaximally competent. However, anymove to involve that
into our evaluation goes beyond the competence principle and would then rest upon a commitment
to the authority tenet rather than the antiauthority tenet.
What we see, then, is that political representation is able to manage and minimize the impact
of the electorate’s incompetence in order to produce political decisions which comply with the com-
petence principle. Political representation does this by distributing the intellectual labor required for
competent decision-making. For any sizable state, there are simply toomany political decisionswhich
need to be made to reasonably expect a significant degree of participation from the entire population.
The problem with direct democracy is that it would take up too many evenings. Even if we believe
that government should reduce the scope of its activities, there remains the work of going through
the decision-making process to determine that no action should be taken. As such, political repre-
sentation allows us to implement a division of labor wherein citizens invest their portion of political
power into representatives who make decisions on their behalf. Brennan raises an interesting point:
“Questions about competence are easy. Questions about economic policy or foreign policy are much
harder. They require specialized knowledge and at times academic training.”198 By delegating and giv-
ing mandates to representatives, voters are freed up from the work involved in the decision-making
process for an entire country. Moreover, politicians are able to dedicate their time and effort to spe-
cialize in politics such that they are, hopefully, able to leverage political power to a greater effect than
their constituents could individually.
By creating a division of labor in the decision-making process, political representation will tend
to ensure that the majority of political decisions, post-electoral decisions, are made by competent
bodies. It may be that this is some happy accident or quirk of what it takes to be elected. Even if
198Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 226.
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that were true, then democrats can happily leverage this side effect of political representation to the
advantage of a better democracy. Still, democrats can plausibly claim that political representation
generates these effects in a non-arbitrary way. That is to say, political representation is a mechanism
which can target and pursue the desirable end that our representatives are competent. The reasoning
is quite simple: voters choose candidates, in part, because of their competence. As a result, political
representation is a mechanism which actively promotes competence in post-electoral decisions by
selecting for competence.
This looks like a difficult claim to resist. It is unfeasible to outright deny that voters elect represen-
tatives on the basis of competence at all. When choosing a candidate, voters are not only motivated
by picking which policy platform they prefer but also by judging which candidate are likely to be com-
petent as their representative.199 Admittedly, the majority of voters are probably not as motivated by
concerns about competence as we would like. But when they consider, for example, the previous posi-
tions held by a candidate or their age and experience, voters are looking for indicators of competence.
Judgment of competence, then, plays at least some role in the way voters elect representatives.
We might suppose, as Brennan suggests, that even if the electorate attempts to select for compe-
tence, they are too incompetent to do so. Even though he proposes thatmost people have a sufficiently
reasonable conception of what competence is, he argues that they have difficulty in actually identify-
ing and voting for competent candidates. As he says, “The empirical literature on voter irrationality
and ignorance does not say that voters have bad standards but rather that they are bad at applying
their reasonable standards.”200 However, this line of resistance does not look promising. Even if we
grant that voters have a difficult time in applying their conception of competence and have difficulties
in identifying and choosing the most competent candidate, we can argue, again, that this effect is not
sufficiently strong. It is enough for democrats that incompetent voters are able to identify and choose
candidates which are sufficiently competent rather than maximally competent. As argued above, vot-
199If the majority of voters are as ignorant and misinformed as Brennan says, then some significant number are likely
ignorant of candidate’s platforms to begin with.
200Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 225.
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ers are motivated by competence considerations in elections and elections do, in fact, tend to result
in competent representatives.
Hitherto, I have focused on how political representation prevents incompetent decision-making
by creating a division of labor which minimizes the risks posed by an incompetent electorate. Given
that Brennanmore or less admits that democracy does tend to performwell in regards to post-electoral
decisions and that some features of democratic institutionsmediate and intervene between voters and
political decisions, I take it that the account I have given above is a feasible explanation of how these
two are related. That is to say, given that we admit that there are some unspecified mechanisms
which might produce this effect and that this effect is evident, all that remains is identifying what
those mechanisms are and how they operate. It seems uncontroversial to suppose that the sort of
democracies which perform quite well are representative democracies. This account, then, simply
fills in this explanatory gap of how it is that representative democracies are able to reliably produce
competent post-electoral decisions in virtue of one of their own characteristic institutional features. I
only argue that this account is more feasible than simply asserting that the explanatory gap is instead
just some unexpected, happy accident or dysfunction. We can see, then, how democracy can integrate
these sorts of institutional mechanism in order to prevent systematic competence principle violations.
4.6 The Competence of Electoral Decisions
Brennan is at pains to allow for the possibility that post-electoral decisions tend to be competent.
However, his primary argument against democracy holds that it is electoral decisions which systemat-
ically violate the competence principle. As discussed above, this seems to follow from some restrained
articulation of the straightforward conclusion. Since the majority of the electorate are ignorant, irra-
tional, and misinformed it follows that at least electoral decisions by that electorate must tend to be
incompetently made. Any defense of democracy, then, must address the charge that it systematically
violates the competence principle in electoral decisions.
This being the case, I will resist the claim that electoral decisions in democracies tend to system-
atically violate the competence principle. It is not clear that the electorate, given how they are, are
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insufficiently competent to make electoral decisions in the first place. Brennan does not make a dis-
tinction between what counts as competence for post-electoral decisions and electoral decisions. An
application of the competence principle with consideration of what counts as competence for electoral
decisions rather than post-electoral decisions decisions does not lead to the conclusion that there are
systematic competence principle violations. Further, this is not meant to be a defense of present
democracy but possible, non-ideal forms of democracy. While this argument is e applicable to most
kinds of electoral decisions made under present forms of democracy, I will observe some exceptions
which my defense will not cover. In these cases I am happy to bite the bullet and suggest that there
may be good reason not to defer those sort of decisions to the general electorate. This, however, is
perfectly compatible with democracy.
As discussed above, representative democracy institutes a division of labor in the decision-making
process between the electorate and government. Broadly speaking, the electorate choose a govern-
ment which then, in turn, makes political decisions on their behalf. The division of labor created by
political representation redistributes the expected duties which one has to the decision-making pro-
cess.201 Ononehand, the delegation of power to representatives gives them responsibility to discharge
the various duties attached to the position. On the other hand, the delegation of power to representa-
tives calls upon the electorate to do just that, to elect representatives to whom are given power and a
mandate. This is more or less how the work is divided in representative democracies.
There is one kind of electoral decision which does not resemble this picture. This describes what
occurs during elections. Electoral decisions, however, may include other kinds of decisions like ref-
erenda. Although Brennan does not raise the issue of referenda, it is worth making the distinction
between these two kinds of electoral decision. A referendum, after all, bypasses the mechanism of
political representation by directly involving the voting public in the decision-making process about
some national political decision. This is entirely different from an electionwhere votersmerely choose
their representatives. Referenda are like exceptions where direct democracy is briefly instantiated. As
I discussed above, I am skeptical that direct democracy can resist Brennan’s objections. Likewise, I
201Perhaps we might perform a weaker notion like expectation rather than duty. Certainly, I do not mean to suggest that
voting should be compulsory. I use duties here in the sense that these are the kind of things which these positions do.
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suspect that referenda are vulnerable to the straight forward conclusion and likely violate the compe-
tence principle.
However, it is evident by the absence of any discussion about referendum that this is not what
Brennan has in mind when he charges that electoral decisions systematically violate the competence
principle. This is not unexpected given that referenda are relatively rare to begin with. As such, I take
it that appealing to the problem of referenda is insufficient to defend Brennan’s conclusion. Further,
I am willing to bite the bullet and accept that referenda violate the competence principle. This is not
too damaging since it comes at little cost to simply conclude that representative democracies should
just avoid holding referenda. It can also be noted that often referenda are about decisions of are an
exceptional nature where the direct consent of the citizens could be a countervailing and overriding
consideration to the presumptive right to competent government. At any rate, I will put the problem
of referenda aside in the following discussion for the reasons above.
The sort of political decision which Brennan has in mind when he refers to electoral decisions are
just elections. Elections, after all, make up the vast majority of political decisions which the electorate
are asked to make. If the voting public systematically violate the competence principle in elections,
then the case can be made that democracy generates rather frequent competence principle violations.
The question, then, iswhether or not the electorate is too incompetentwhenmaking election decisions.
Brennan seems to take the straightforward conclusion that since the a significant portion of the elec-
torate is ignorant, irrational, and misinformed about political matters, they are too incompetent to
make election decisions.
It is not obvious that this is the case. Consider that different activities have different requirements
for what qualifies as competence in those activities. Determining representatives is not the same
as determining policy. Therefore, we ought to expect that what counts as competence for either is
different. While it may be the case that some substantial standard of knowledge is required in order
tomake a decision about a complex issuewhich affects the country, it is unclearwhywe should assume
that the same is required in order to make a decision about who should represent us. Voters do not
vote for policy in an election, they merely vote for who should be their representative.202 As such, the
202It may be that some misunderstand what they are doing when they cast a vote.
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conditions required to be a competent voter are different from those required to be a competent policy
maker.
It might be argued that because the result of an election has an effect on what post-electoral de-
cisions are made, voters must have the competences required to make those post-electoral decisions.
This, however, does not seem to be a promising line of argument. For one, it is clear that the compe-
tence principle applies to individual decisions. While we might cast our vote in the hope that some
subsequent post-electoral decision is made, the two actual decisions are very much distinct. Given
that the competence principle is a non-contamination theory, later decisions should not affect prior
decisions. Indeed, it is unclear how the competence principle could be applied to elections at all if that
were the case. If the competence of an election depends upon the subsequent political decisions which
are affected by that election, then we would have to wait an indeterminate amount of time before we
could be able to determine what is required for that election to be competent.
If we understand that voters are choosing a representative in an election, then we can then come
to an idea of what is necessary for voters to be competent during an election. However, this raises the
question of what it is for an election to be good or bad. After all, if something requires competence
then there must be some way to succeed or to fail at it. While, from the perspective of an individual
voter, an election might be considered as success or a failure if, say, their preferred candidate was not
elected or some other subjective reason, we are interested in what it is for an election to be better or
worse from an objective perspective. What is more, given the scope which the competence principle
has us consider, the success of our election cannot depend upon the subsequent political decisions. I
suggest, then, that an election can be judged as more or less successful based simply on the chosen
candidates’ competence to perform the relevant duties of their positions.
The relevant competency under consideration, then, is whether or not the electorate is capable
of identifying and choosing candidates who are sufficiently competent for the position in question.
Admittedly, without a precise definition of competence, it will be difficult to demonstrate definitively
whether or not the electorate is competent. However, I argue that we have presumptive reasons for
supposing that the electorate tends to be sufficiently competent, although not experts, at deciding
elections. To put it another way, the voting public is good enough to at least tend to elect sufficiently
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competent candidates even if they do not tend to elect the maximally competent candidate. Again, for
complying with the competence principle and the antiauthority tenet, that is all that is required.
After all, the evidence suggests that it is likely the case that the voting public are competent at
electing competent representatives. They certainly performbetter thanwhatwemight expect from the
wayBrennan argues. As discussed in the previous section, post-electoral decisions tend to complywith
the competence principle. This suggests that those governing bodies responsible, including elected
representatives, tend to be competent themselves. As discussed in the previous section, this is backed
up by the historical record. This in turn suggests that the electorate are competent at making electoral
decisions. Any argument which argues that they are incompetent must be able to account for how it
is that they reliably produce such apparently unexpected results.
What is more, it is not obvious that the voting public are relevantly ignorant, irrational, or misin-
formed. Any argument which claims that they are must show that they lack the knowledge requisite
for the task in question. Mere lack of knowledge about some subject is not disqualifying if it is not rel-
evant: an ignorance of astrophysics does not disqualify a lens maker working on a telescope. As such,
it must be shown that most people are too ignorant, irrational, or misinformed about competence to
evaluate competence. This is problematic. While Brennan argues that most people are bad at apply-
ing their conception of competence, he admits that most people have a reasonable understanding of
what competence is. Further, this understanding is good enough that Brennan argues the electorate
are capable of democratically agreeing upon a concept of competence which is good enough for estab-
lishing an epistocracy. That is to say, the electorate is competent enough to determine what makes
people competent. This, then, suggests that they are not so ignorant, irrational, or misinformed about
competence. As argued in the previous section, even if we believe that most people are bad at apply-
ing their concept of competence, it is apparent that they are good enough to at best be able if reliably
choosing sufficiently capable candidates if not identify who is the most competent. While we might
have the intuition that the latter would lead to better results, the former is sufficient for compliance
with the competence principle.
I take it that these are good reasons for presuming that the electorate are competent at electoral
decision-making. Given that most voters have a sufficiently reasonable understanding of competence
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and that past electoral results show that they are reliable at electing sufficiently competent represen-
tatives, it looks like it is probably the case that most people are sufficiently competent to vote in our
elections. An argument otherwise must conjure some weighty, countervailing consideration and be
able to account for this better than expected performance. Without a more precise definition of com-
petence, it is difficult to come to a conclusionwith anymore confidence. However, the burden of proof
rests upon the argument that the electorate is incompetent at making electoral decisions. Given these
two reasons, it seems reasonable to presume that they are competent until shown otherwise. In which
case, it is unclear to what extent democracies systematically violate the competence principle during
electoral decisions if they systematically violate the competence principle at all.
This argument rests on the distinction that what voters are doing is choosing which candidate is
capable of representing them in government rather than choosing what policy decisions government
should make. Because political representation creates this division of labor in the decision-making,
the competence of the voter is not dependent on the degree to that they are ignorant, irrational, or
misinformed about political issues. The straightforward conclusion is not apt in this case. Given the
evidence, I have argued that there is good reason for presuming that the electorate are likely competent
in this regard, at least. Otherwise, we are to suppose that there is some obscured reasonwhich demon-
strates their incompetence despite, against all odds, their reliability at electing sufficiently competent
representatives. This argumentmakes the case that if there is a systematic violation of the competence
principle, democratic institutions are able to limit and manage it with some success.
This argument does not argue that the electorate, or the government, never make incompetent
decisions. Only that it a sophisticated form of democracy does not violate the competence principle to
the degree which we would expect from Brennan’s account. It also does not argue that the entrenched
ignorance and irrationality in themajority of the public is not a significant or alarming problem. While
the institutional mechanisms available to democracy allow it to comply with the competence princi-
ple, a more rational and informed electorate would likely lead to better results: a more rational and
informed electorate would probably lead to fewer competence principle violations and a better quality
of governance.
However, this is not relevant to our inquiry. The competence principle is only a disqualifier, aman-
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ifestation of the antiauthority tenet, which tells us when a decision-making process has resulted in an
illegitimate decision. Our inquiry is to determine whether democracy or epistocracy is likely to result
in fewer competence principle violations. Certainly, democracy does not do as well as we would like.
While it does not systematically violate the competence principle in either electoral or post-electoral
decisions to an obviously egregious extent, there is room to improve in terms of both the competence
principle and higher standards of quality. However, this is not enough for the antiauthority tenet to
be a forceful objection against democracy. Wemight well wonder if “incompetent” decisions arise out
of a sufficiently competent body of representatives who have been elected by sufficiently competent
voters, should we then admit that governing means trying to resolve complicated and hard problems.
Further still, should we then not also admit that attempting to tackle such challenges means some-
times making making mistakes. My epistemic defense of democracy, then, is simple. If we analyze
how the competence principle would apply to possible sophisticated forms of democracy then we ob-
serve that such democracies do a good job despite a population which is mostly ignorant, irrational,
and incompetent.
4.7 How Competent Is Epistocracy?
I have so far only claimed that we can observe that representative democracy performs better
than what Brennan’s account predicts. Democracy does not necessarily systematically violate the
competence principle. This is only part of the story, however. We are trying to make an evaluation
of how democracy compares to epistocracy. While I have argued that democracy does a good job at
complying with the competence principle, the question is whether or not epistocracy would do any
better.
This is quite difficult to resolve. As Brennan notes, talking about epistocracy is a speculative affair:
It’s hard to knowwhether epistocracy would be better, because we have not really tried it.
Some governments have had epistocratic elements in the past, but not of the exact sort I
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advocate here. When I argue that epistocracy could do better than democracy, I have to
speculate more than I would like to.203
There are no present examples of epistocracy which we can observe. What is more, Brennan denies
that history is able to provide us with informative examples as well.204 This presents difficulties. We
are asked to compare democracy against speculations of what something that is only theoreticalmight
look like in practice.
This leaves epistocracy open to speculations about why epistocracy would not do as well as it
is speculated. There are a number of such arguments against epistocracy which we might briefly
survey. For instance, it is not entirely persuasive that approximating competence is reliable enough
to produced the hoped for result of a dramatically more competent political decision-making process.
After all, for various reasons, Brennan proposes approximating competence through less demanding
assessments like the citizenship exam. Also, the efficacy of such a moderate epistocratic constraint
could be dubious: the ignorant, irrational, and misinformed members of the public tend not to vote
anyways. If the standards which approximate competence are set too low then epistocracy mostly
strips political power from those who rarely exercise it. The epistocrat might argue this suggests that
the cost of such a policy would be less than expected, but the democratmight respond that the benefits
are not enough to justify the costs.
Further, even if the correlations between whatever indicator and knowledge relevant to political
issues is sufficiently strong and reliable, it is not clear to me that knowledge is sufficient for compe-
203Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 205.
204I am deeply skeptical of this. There are a number of attempts at implementing epistocratic elements in various gov-
ernments and organizations to varying degrees of success and failure. Historical examples of epistocracy is not limited to
obscure and short-lived oddities. Imperial China had what can be retroactively described as an epistocratic government
which governed and administrated the country alongside imperial rule. Day-to-day political duties were performed by
scholar-officials. These were bureaucrats, advisors, and governors who could only be appointed to office after qualifying
through an extremely rigorous civil service examination system. It was rare for a candidate to be ready to take the provincial
exams before the age of 30 which, if passed, would allow the candidate to then take the metropolitan and then the palace
exams. This system was in place in some form or another from 165 BCE to 1905 CE. Even if these are not of the exact
sort of epistocracies which Brennan would like to propose, they at least inform us in the ways which epistocracy might fail.
This is not insignificant. The examinations in Imperial China are particularly interesting in regards to approximating com-
petence given the institutional failure of the system to create officials with any practical competence in addition to being
extremely knowledgeable about literary classics and accepted philosophical dogma. What is more, if epistocrats cannot
offer an explanation of history in their account, then their theory fails to take all the evidence into account.
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tence. Competence, after all, depends upon what you are doing. Knowledge itself might be sufficient
for department bureaucrats who are, or should be, meritocratically appointed anyway. On the other
hand, the people elected to represent us in government are often asked to do more; to be leaders or
diplomats and so on. All too often, crises arise. In such times, we look to those leaders and rely upon
them to fortify our resolve, to give us courage, to weather such storms and to do great things. Leaders
must be able to inspire. The qualities which are called upon in the course of their duties are not lim-
ited to just knowledge or reason. Unfortunately, it is not obvious that either knowledge or reason are
strongly and reliably correlated with qualities like tact, charisma, or character.
Additionally, we might suppose that if epistocracies were substantially more competent than
democracy, then we ought to expect epistocracies would tend to result in different decisions. It would
be difficult to motivate epistocracy as somethingmore than amere academic novelty otherwise. How-
ever, it is not clear that the kind of epistocracy which Brennan proposes would systematically result in
different policy decisions. Brennan argues that there is empirical evidence that the incompetent and
the competent have systematically different policy preferences.205 However, systematically different
policy preferences are not sufficient to conclude that there would also be systematically different de-
cisions. Even though I have a strong preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate ice cream and
my friend only has a moderate preference, we both always decide to buy vanilla instead of chocolate
when given a choice. In other words, it is not enough to show that an enlightened public would be
more or less supportive of some policy. Rather, it has to be shown that an enlightened public would
would actually disagree with what the actual public decides.
Given this possibility, it is not clear that the empirical evidence shows that there are systematically
different policy preferences which are of sufficient magnitude to result in systematic, substantive dis-
agreement. By substantive disagreement, I mean that the preferences differences are such that an
enlightened public would support a policy when a previously they would not and vice versa. A prefer-
205He cites the research on the policy preferences of high and low income (although he assumes that this is a strong
enough correlation to construe Gilens as noting that the results tell us about the policy preferences of high-information
voters) Democrats byMartin Gilens inAffluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012)
and the analysis of ANES data (which Althaus is careful to note is only hypothetical and does not tell us how people would
really think if they knew more about politics) by Scott L. Althaus in Collective Preference in Democratic Politics: Opinion
Surveys and the Will of the People (2003)
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ence differencewhich only results in a different degree of support is not sufficient for a straightforward
conclusion that there would be systematically different decisions. This is not to say that the difference
in policy preference is not significant or that it shows that political knowledge does not matter. I only
claim that it somewhat undermines the intuition that an epistocracy would be dramatically differ-
ent. For the sake of brevity, I will only suggest that the data which Gilens and Althaus provide do
not demonstrate that the systematically different policy preferences generally results in substantive
disagreement.
Pursuing any of these arguments against epistocracy, however, is outside the scope of this paper
and our present evaluation. For one, it is difficult to assess the weight these speculative objections
have without putting epistocracy into practice. Before democracy was tried, there were a number of
speculations—like the objection that the common person was too ignorant for democracy to work at
all—which were seriously considered until actual practice revealed their impotence. Wemight, gener-
ously, consider that the weight of these objections are reasonably contestable so long as epistocracy
only exists as a theory.
More importantly, the present question is whether democracy or epistocracy violate the compe-
tence principle less frequently. As I have argued, democracy does not systematically violate the com-
petence principle. Consequently, the frequency of democracy’s violations is evaluated by observing
and counting the number of its unsystematic violations rather than through some conceptual analysis.
This presents a quandary since there are no examples of epistocracy for us to observe. Suppose, for
the sake of argument, that epistocracy also does not systematically violate the competence principle.
In which case, the frequency of epistocracy’s violation would also be evaluated by observation and
not conceptual analysis. The fact that the proposed, and presumably, more feasible forms of epis-
tocracy utilize an approximation of competence rules out any argument that they must somehow be
competent analytically. As such, the frequency of epistocracy’s violations is uncountable since there
is no epistocracy to observe. This is a problem since we cannot conduct a comparison of something
countable against something that is not countable.
Considering this, Brennan’s argument against democracy is invalid until there is an actual epistoc-
racy. Without being able to observe the frequency of unsystematic competence principle violations,
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there is noway of verifying the claim that epistocracywould performbetter. However, I will argue that
the fact that democracy performs well enough to necessitate counting the difference in unsystematic
violations is reason enough against epistocracy. Brennan claims that if democracy and epistocracy do
equally well then we should be neutral in preferring one to the other. I argue that a neutral result is,
in fact, a negative one for epistocracy.
4.8 The Cost of Epistocracy
The fact that democracy does not violate the competence principle in a systematic way is ground
for us to say that democracy and epistocracy do equally well for practical purposes. The claim here
is not that they are strictly equal in the frequency of competence principle violations. I only mean
that the two present us with a close enough comparison that, in the scheme of things, the differences
are small enough to be consideredmarginal enough not to obviously sway our evaluation between the
two one way or the other. In which case, the competence principle does not give a particularly weighty
argument for one or the other.
This claim should not be surprising. After all, a system can only be so good in this regard. The
competence principle is a disqualifier. It does not give us any reason to see one systemas better beyond
the point that one violates the competence principle less than the other. If we suppose that both
democracy and epistocracy had perfect compliance with the competence principle but epistocracy
performed better in some other regard, then, given the terms of our present evaluation, we would
conclude that they are equal. Both comply with the competence principle equally well. Insofar as
both systems approach perfect compliance, the difference between the two become increasingly less.
In which case, if both democracy and epistocracy both avoid violating the competence principle
systematically, then they would be roughly equivalent in our present evaluation. If the difference lies
in the frequency of unsystematic violations, then the difference will be just that: unsystematic. Since
such differences would arise not out of any intrinsic feature of democracy or epistocracy but out of
some extrinsic feature, it is beyond what we can assess from only a conceptual analysis. We are look-
ing at a complex and chaotic interaction of any number of arbitrary, extrinsic features of the world
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which determine how unsystematic violations arise. What is more, since both tend to comply with
the competence principle, the chaotic difference arises out of relatively small sums. For all practi-
cal purposes, then, democracy and epistocracy are roughly equivalent according to the competence
principle.
It should be remembered that Brennan rejected the authority tenet. He instead justifies epis-
tocracy on the grounds of the antiauthority tenet. Epistocrats who follow Brennan’s approach are
constrained in their possible responses as a result. For epistocracy to be legitimate, the antiauthority
tenet must give a stronger objection to democracy and all other possible options.206 The argument for
epistocracy depends upon the argument against democracy. In which case, if the argument against
democracy depends upon the competence principle, then epistocrats who endorse the antiauthority
tenet and not the authority tenet cannot defend epistocracy by pointing to better performance in other
regards.
ForBrennan, then, wehave arrived at a neutral result. That is to say, “if democracy and epistocracy
perform equally well, then we may justly instantiate either system.”207 He thinks that in such a case
we ought to be indifferent to either democracy or epistocracy. When “the choice between democracy
and epistocracy is something of a toss-up—in effect, it just doesn’t matter which one we pick.”208
Interestingly, Brennan seems to take this as opening a positive argument for epistocracy. He argues
that a toss-up puts democrats in an uncomfortable position. He concludes that “when I say, ‘Let’s try
epistocracy!’ you should either be with me or at least not against me”.209 It would seem, then, that
in giving this epistocratic defense of democracy democrats would have no arguments against at least
trying epistocracy if it is likely to do equally as well.210
206Realistically, even epistocracy can make mistakes and allow the incompetent to endanger innocents. The question is
not what perfectly avoids disqualification by the antiauthority tenet but what is the least egregious
207Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 16.
208Ibid., p. 203.
209Ibid.
210Brennan dismisses proceduralist and “semiotic” arguments for democracy. He takes it that democrats cannot defend
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As Brennan stipulates, however, our inquiry is nonideal. We are not implementing either theory
ex nihilo. Rather, we have to consider how the actual facts of the world would affect any possible
future implementation of either. As a result, an apparently neutral result is in fact a negative one for
epistocracy. For epistocracy to be a serious prospect it must do considerably better than democracy.
After all, in considering the world as it is, epistocracy will come at a greater cost. Democracy is already
in place around the world and enjoys the general approval and acceptance as a legitimate and good
form of government in most democratic countries. While I am not defending real, present forms of
democracy, the cost for democratic reform in an already present democracy is likely to be considerably
less than that of building a new form of government from the ground up. Epistocracy, then, is more
difficult to implement in our circumstances.
In some ways, Brennan admits this. In his mind, “the best argument for democracy is Burkean
conservatism. Democracy is not a fully just social system, but it’s too risky and dangerous to replace it
with something else.”211 Burkean conservatism is, roughly, the idea that we ought to exercise extreme
cautionwhenmaking radical changes to already existing institutions. This was the lesson for Edmund
Burke of the attempt of the French Revolution to dismantle the monarchy and implement a democ-
racy.212 Present day institutions, as flawed as they are, have come about through a complicated history
whichmay obscure the reasonwhy those institutions are that way until those institutions are removed.
Implementing radical change is risky and may bring problems to the surface which were minimized
and unseen under the previously existing institutions. Experimentation, then, is dangerous. Bren-
nan thinks this is a reasonable argument and concludes that any attempt to realize epistocracy should
be restrained. He suggests that implementing epistocracy can be trialled in small experiments and
thereby reduce the risk and dangers with which Burkean conservatism is concerned.213 By accepting
democracy through other avenues besides an epistocratic defense. Obviously, there is room to resist Brennan by objecting
to these arguments against democracy. For the sake of argument, I will grant Brennan these objections to democracy if only
to show that he still fails to persuade that we ought to implement an epistocracy.
211Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 230.
212Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1987 [1790]).
213It should be noted that this restrained experimentation could also be construed as a proposal for an epistocratic Fabi-
89
Burkean conservatism as a reasonable consideration, Brennan admits that implementing epistocracy
is risky and dangerous. These are costs which arise out of implementing epistocracy; they may be
manageable by approaches like small trials, but there is a cost which democracy no longer imposes.
Instituting an epistocracy is, after all, radical. It entails dismantling a government which is gen-
erally perceived to be legitimate and establishing a new government founded on different principles
which have yet to be generally accepted. Given the nonideal state of the world, epistocracy is revo-
lutionary: it entails a revolution.214 It is outside the scope of this paper to consider the minimum
requirements of a successful revolution.215 Suffice it to say that it is rarely a simple and easy thing
to do. Because any attempt to create an epistocracy would amount to a revolution, implementing
epistocracy requires great effort to persuade and implement and comes at great risk and danger.
What is proposed, then is that we take radical steps to experiment with a new system of govern-
ment that is likely to do just as well as what is possible through reforming the current system. This
is not an uncomfortable position for democrats. Again, this is not to say that no solution is necessary
to the real problems which affect existing democracies. This is only to observe that we are asked to
choose between the extraordinarily daunting task of revolution or the difficult task of institutional
reform in order to achieve the same end. Put in these terms, it is clear that democratic reform is the
preferable choice.
Itmight be tempting for epistocrats to deny such reforms are possible. Perhaps it could be claimed
that the sort of institutional reforms which would achieve the same end as epistocracy are too unfea-
sible or ideal. However, it is apparent that Brennan believes that there are forms of democracy that
anism. Epistocrats might instead endorse a gradualist approach by introducing epistocratic-like democratic reforms with
the aim of gradually bringing democracy increasingly closer to epistocracy until the implementation of epistocracy is an
easier prospect.
214Not all revolutions entail a rebellion.
215The literature regarding the plausibility of a successful socialist revolution is illuminating. In particular, in Prze-
worski’s “Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the Transition to Socialism” raises a similar argument under the guise
of the free rider problem. Given that revolution will come at a cost to participants in the short-term, but it is not necessary
for everyone to participate, it seems rational for the individual to be a free-rider and let others bear the costs instead. Should
most individuals follow this rational choice, then it is unlikely that sufficient numbers of participants will be garnered to
bring about a revolution. The free-rider objection to socialism is a fairly popular one. Presumably, we should also hold
epistocracy up to the same test.
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are feasible and which he suggests we ought to pursue. Recall that Brennan defined epistocracy as a
political system that distributes political power according to knowledge or competence as a matter of
law or policy. Democracy is defined as a system which, by law, grants universal suffrage. Under these
definitions of of epistocracy and democracy, a number of the epistocracies which Brennan proposes
are, in fact, democracies.
The most notable case is Brennan’s proposal for universal suffrage with epistocratic veto. This
system is essentially contemporary democracy with one addition. As Brennan describes it,
This system has the same political bodies and institutions we find in contemporary
democracies. It has unrestricted, equal universal suffrage…Yet the system also has an
epistocratic council, a formally epistocratic deliberative body.216
This epistocratic body would be open to the public upon satisfying some qualification which demon-
strates, or more likely approximates, competence. This epistocratic body would then be given veto
power over the democratic bodies when it judges that the decisions are malicious, incompetent or
unreasonable.217 Notably, it would not be granted the power to make law. Such a body, then, would
exercise an epistocratic check over what would otherwise be a democracy.
Brennan gradually admits that universal suffrage with epistocratic veto might not be an epistoc-
racy. He initially introduces it as a “hybrid system”.218 Afterwards, he suggests that it is a “borderline
case”219 and argues that epistocratic veto is “compatible” with democracy220 Brennan eventually con-
cludes that “Universal suffrage with epistocratic veto seems to capture what is desirable about epistoc-
racy without itself being an epistocracy. It also captures much of what is desirable about democracy
216Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 215.
217Ibid., p. 216.
218Ibid., p. 215.
219Ibid., p. 218.
220Ibid., p. 219.
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while providing a check against democratic irrationality and incompetence.”221 The proposal for uni-
versal suffrage with epistocratic veto, then, is not a proposal for epistocracy at all. It is, in fact, incom-
patible with epistocracy by definition. While it introduces an institution which may be characterized
as epistocratic-like, this is not sufficient to take away the fact that what it proposes is essentially demo-
cratic. What is more, all it proposes is essentially institutional reform rather than any radical restruc-
turing of our basic institutions away from democratic principles. Given our nonideal circumstances,
all that would be required to implement universal suffrage with epistocratic veto is for our current
democracy to pass legislation which introduces the epistocratic body which Brennan describes.
We can also consider Brennan’s proposal of government by simulated oracle to also be essen-
tially democratic. This system is based on the claim that social scientists, specifically Althaus, have
demonstrated that we can estimate what an informed electorate would prefer. Brennan proposes that
surveys that track citizens’ political preferences, demographic characteristics, and basic objective po-
litical knowledge. He claims that “Once we have this knowledge, we can simulate what would happen
if the electorate’s demographics remained unchanged, but all citizens were able to get perfect scores
on tests of objective political knowledge.”222 Through some transparent statistical method, gathering
this information from the public would arrive at an apparently competent decision.
It is not clear how this would qualify as an epistocracy by definition. Political decisions are made
by surveying the public—possibly evenmaking such surveying compulsory in order to arrive at a richer
andmore representative data set—with no de jure restrictions of political power according to assessed
competence. In fact, such surveys, when taken as official declarations of the individual’s preferences,
are just a more detailed and extensive ballot. In which case, government by simulated oracle pre-
serves universal suffrage. Despite its peculiarity, it is essentially democratic. While it suggests a more
radical reform than epistocratic veto, it is still within the realm of institutional reform rather than
necessitating a revolution.
If these are serious proposals, then it must be admitted that democrats are able to pursue institu-
tional reform in order to achieve the same ends as epistocrats. This is not to necessarily endorse these
221Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 220.
222Ibid., p. 221.
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particular proposals which Brennan make. It is only to argue that if these particular proposals are
feasible reforms, then democrats will have a number of other alternatives which they might suggest
as well. Democratic reform, then, is a viable option.
Itmight be suggested that these sort of reforms introduce epistocracy into democracy. As Brennan
describes a number of mechanisms already present in democracy, “Each of these mediating factors
tends to reduce the power of the majority of the moment during the election and instead place greater
power in the hands of more informed citizens. In that sense, there are epistocratic checks within a
democratic system.”223 While we could characterize these reforms as being epistocratic in the sense
that they are epistocratic-like, it should not obfuscate the point that, even with these reforms, what is
proposed is still essentially democratic. So long as the law ensures universal suffrage instead of dis-
tributing political power according to competence, then that government is a democracy by Brennan’s
definition.
In which case, a neutral result is a negative one for epistocracy. If they do equally well, it does
not follow that in a nonideal framework that we ought to be indifferent between the two. Although
both would be means toward the same end, epistocracy come at great risk and cost given the nonideal
circumstances we find ourselves in. Since democracy does not systematically violate the competence
principle, it is difficult to see why we ought to see epistocracy as a worthwhile prospect for these
reasons. Moreover, it is difficult to see why we ought to be indifferent between the two in a nonideal
framework. Instead, democrats andwould-be epistocrats should prefer a democracy with epistocratic
characteristics as the way to avoid systematically violating the competence principle.
223Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 200.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In light of this analysis, democratic reform is themost promising answer for effective change. It is
difficult to sell the prospect of revolution when the expected results are less than revolutionary. This
is not to dismiss the work of epistocratic theory wholesale. If we can ensure that our decision-making
processes are more competently performed, then we should hope that government performs better as
a result. The problem for epistocrats is that this can be pursued through institutional reform rather
than dismantling and reconstructing the entire state. If similar results can be achieved through less
radical means, then we ought to consider and exhaust these options before revolution. As such, the
work done in epistocratic theory should inform our consideration of democratic reforms. Epistocrats
might take solace by concluding that this is a proposal for “epistocratic democracy”. A rose by any
other name would smell as sweet.
Finally, we should also consider whether we have misidentified ignorance as the problematic fea-
ture of competence. There are a number of concerning phenomena emerging in political psychology
like increasing polarization and tribalism. The sort of behavior which Brennan highlights may not
be due to incompetence as he describes but these sort of biases and behaviors. Moreover, there are
entities which leverage these phenomena to exploit people for their own ends whether it be for profit
or for nefarious causes. It is not clear that the degree of knowledge about whatever subject is suffi-
cient for resisting these phenomena. Even experts are vulnerable to biases. As such, it is also unclear
how stripping political power from the ignorant will help in this regard. The problem arises from the
way we acquire knowledge rather than the amount of knowledge we have. In which case, the solution
seems to be educational reform such that good epistemic practices are instilled in the public. This
might be described as a proposal about competence. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.
94
REFERENCES
Aristotle. The Nicomachean ethics. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
Armor, D., and S. Taylor. “The effects of mindset on behavior: self-regulation in deliberative and im-
plementational frames of mind.” Personality and Social Psychologcy Bulletin 29 (2003): 86–95.
Arpaly, Nomy. Unprincipled virtue : an inquiry into moral agency. Oxford ; New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003.
Bennet, Stephen Earl. “”Know-Nothings” Revisited”: The Meaning of Political Ignorance Today.” So-
cial Science Quarterly 69, no. 2 (1988): 476–490. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42862409.
Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, andWilliamMcPhee. Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a
Presidential Campation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
Birch, Sarah. Full Participation; A Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting. Manchester: Manch-
ester University Press, 2009.
Bogardus, Tomas. “A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View.” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 324–335.
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky.Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Pref-
erence. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Brennan, Jason. Against Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Edited by J. G. A. Pocock. Cambridge, MA:
Hackett, 1987 [1790].
Carpini, Michael X. Delli, and Scott Keeter. “Stability and Change in the U.S. Public’s Knowledge of
Politics.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 55, no. 4 (1991): 583–612. http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2749408.
Chong, Dennis. “Degrees of Rationality in Politics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology,
edited by David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy, 96–129. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Christensen, David. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” Philosophical Review 116, no.
2 (2007): 187–217.
Christiano, Thomas. “Against Democracy.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2017. https://
ndpr.nd.edu/news/against-democracy/.
Cohen, Joshua. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In Contemporary Political Philosophy,
edited by Robert Goodin and Philip Petit, 159–70. Boston: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.
95
Condorcet, Marquis de. “Essay on the Application ofMathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making.”
In Condorcet: Selected Writings, edited by Keith M. Baker, 48–49. New York: Macmillan Press,
1976.
Conover, Pamela, Stanley Feldman, and Kathleen Knight. “The Personal and Political Underpinnings
of Economic Forecasts.” American Journal of Political Science 31 (1987): 559–83.
Converse, Philip E. “Attitudes and Nonattitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue.” In The Quantitative
Analysis of Social Problems, edited by E. Tufte. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970.
. “Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information.” In Information and Demo-
cratic Processes, edited by J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990.
. “The nature of belief systems in mass publics (1964).” Critical Review 18, nos. 1–3 (2006):
1–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810608443650.
Cooper, John. “Political Animals and Civic Friendship.” In Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, edited
by Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety, 65–91. Boulder, CO: Rowman / Littlefield, 2005.
Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement.” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 478–502.
Estlund, David. “Desire, Identity and Existence: Essays in honor of T. M. Penner.” Chap. Why Not
Epistocracy?, edited by Naomi Reshotko, 53–69. Academic Printing / Publishing, 2003.
Estlund, DavidM.Democratic authority : a philosophical framework. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008.
Feddersen, Timonthy, Sean Gailmard, and Alvaro Sandroni. “A Bias toward Unselfishness in Large
Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence.” American Political Science Review 103 (2009):
175–92.
Feldman, Richard. “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.” In Epistemology Futures, edited
by Stephen Hetherington, 216–236. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press,
2007.
Funk, CarolynL. “TheDual Influence of Self-Interest andSocietal Interest in PublicOpinion.”Political
Research Quarterly 53 (2000): 37–62.
Funk, Carolyn L., and Patricia Garcia-Monet. “The Relationship between Personal and National Con-
cerns in Public Perceptions of the Economy.” Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 317–42.
Green, Donald, and ian Shapiro. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in
Political Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2001.
96
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and
Civill. Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009.
Holbrook, Thomas, and James C. Garand. “Homo Economus? Economic Information and Economic
Voting.” Political Research Quarterly 49, no. 2 (1996): 351–75.
Holst, Catherine. “What is epistocracy?” In Sacred Science?, edited by Lund-Olsen Øyen S.A. and
Vaage N.S. T., 41–4. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2012.
Huddy, Leonie, David Sears, and Jack S. Levy. “The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology.”
Chap. Introduction, second, edited by Leonie Huddy, David Sears, and Jack S. Levy, 1–21. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Iyengar, S, and M Lepper. “When Choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79 (2000): 995–1006.
Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on
Group Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 3, 690–707. eprint: https :
//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12152. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
abs/10.1111/ajps.12152.
Kinder, Donald, and Roderick Kiewiet. “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of
Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” American
Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): 495–527.
Lever, Annabelle. “’A Liberal Defence of Compulsory Voting’: Some Reasons for Scepticism.” POLI-
TICS 28, no. 1 (2008): 61–64.
Locke, John. Two treatises of government [in eng]. 2nd ed.. London: Cambridge University Press,
1967.
López-Guerra, Claudio. “The Enfranchisement Lottery.” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 10
(2011): 211–33.
Madison, James. “The Federalist.” Chap. No. 10. New York: Barnes / Noble Books, 2006.
Manning, Jennifer E.Membership of the 115th Congress: A Profile. Technical report R44762. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017.
Mansbridge, Jane. “Self-Interest andPolitical Transformation.” InReconsidering theDemocratic Pub-
lic, edited by George E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, 91–109. University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1993.
Markus, Gregory. “The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential
Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 32 (1988): 137–
54.
97
Matheson, Jonathan. “Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief.” In The Future of Social Epistemology:
A Collective Vision, edited by James Collier, 139–148. 2015.
Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. Auckland: The Floating Press,
2009.
Miller, Dale. “The Norm of Self-Interest.” American Psychologist 54 (1999): 1053–60.
Mutz, Diana. “Direct and Indirect Routes to Politicizing Personal Experience: Does Knowledge Make
a Difference.” Public Opinion Quarterly 57 (1993): 483–502.
. “Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience.” American Journal of Political
Science 36 (1992): 483–508.
Mutz, Diana, and Jeffrey Mondak. “Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based Judgments of
Fairness and Well-Being.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 284–308.
Neuman, W. Russell. The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Elec-
torate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’
Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Page, Scott, and Lu Hong. “Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents.” Journal of Economic Theory
97 (2001): 123–63.
Plato. Republic. New York: Barnes / Noble Books, 2004.
Popkin, Samuel L., and Michael A Dimock. “Political Knowledge and Civic Competence.” In Citizen
Competence and Democratic Institutions, edited by S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan. University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.
Price, Vincent. “Political Information.” In Measures of Political Attitudes, edited by J. P. Robinson,
P. R. Shaver, and L. S. Wrightsman. San Diego: Academic Press, 1999.
Przeworski, Adam. “Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the Transition to Socialism.” Politics
& Society 10, no. 2 (1980): 125–153.
Rawls, John. A theory of justice. Rev. ed.. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1999.
Rhodebeck, Laurie. “The Politics of Greed? Political Preferences among the Elderly.” Journal of Poli-
tics 55 (1993): 342–64.
Ryfe, David. “Does Deliberative Democracy Work?” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 49–
71.
Schwarzenbach, Sibyl A. “On Civic Friendship.” Ethics 107 (1996): 97–128.
98
Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. “Self-Interest in Americans’ Political Opinions.” In Beyond Self-
Interest, edited by Jane Mansbridge, 147–70. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Smith, Eric R.A.N. The Unchanging American Voer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
Sunstein, Cass R. “‘Partyism’ Now Trumps Racism.” Bloomberg View, September 2014. http://www.
bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-22/[artyism-now-trumps-racism.
99
